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PE-i-576 Part  I 
DEVELOPMENT  OF  EUROPEAN  INTEGRATION 
- 1  -I.  GENERAL  PROBLEMS 
In his  New  Year message,  Mr.  Pierre Werner,  Luxembourg  Min-
ister of State,  stated,  inter alia:  "The  possibility of set-
tling the persistent differences  between the  Six as  soon  as  pos-
sible is the  only frame  of reference  against which  I  can envis-
age  Europe's  developing in an orderly manner. 
Luxembourg feels  honoured that all five  partner Governments 
proposed  that the  extraordinary session of the  Council  in Jan-
uary should be  held  in the  capital of  the  Grand  Duchy.  While  we 
are grateful ,at  this confirmation of Luxembourg  as  the  setting 
for the  European Communities,  we  are fully aware  of the  respon-
sibilities that will fall to  the  Luxembourg  Delegation,  at every 
level,  during its presidency of the  Council  of Ministers  in the 
first half of  1966.  It may  perhaps  be  feared by  some  that the 
weight  of  the  smallest partner may  be  unable  to prevail against 
the  centrifugal forces  that  are  liable to  make  their presence 
felt. 
I  base  my  hopes  mainly on  the  actual weight  of the  Communi-
ty,  on the need for  a  Common  Market  in the  interests of the  ex-
pansion  and  of the  prosperity of all of  our six countries.  I 
base  them  on  the authority the  Community  already enjoys  in the 
third world. 
I  also believe in the value  of discussions,  even if these 
do  at times  involve  a  clash of views.  The  Luxembourg  Govern-
ment. envisages the hopes  of reconciling the various views  inher-
ent in the  presidency not  with  the  resolve  to reach fallacious 
or ambiguous  compromises  at any price,  nor to  evade  the practi-
cal and real  issues that may  arise  from  the  operation of the 
Community not all of which  could have  been anticipated; it in-
tends  to face  the  problems  without  equivocation on points  of 
procedure  or principle.  Its action is based on the  sound rule 
that undertakings  must  be  kept  and that  these problems  must  be 
solved within the  framework  of the  institutions established and 
confirmed by the  Treaties."  (Luxemburger Wort,  3  January 1966) 
2.  The  Congress  of the  European Union  of Christian Democrats 
The  European Christian Democrat  Union held its 17th Con-
gress  in Taormina  from  9  to  12  December  under the  chairmanship 
of Mr.  Mariano  Rumor,  Secretary of the  Italian Christian Demo-
crat Party.  The  theme  of the  Congress  was  "the democratic  fu-
ture  of  Europe".  The  EUCD  is the  new  organization,  founded  last 
- 3 -year,  which co-ordinates  the activities of the  various  European 
parties whose  political emphasis  is Christian Democrat  and 
which,  a  year ago,  took the place  of  the  "Nouvelles  Equipes  In-
ternationales". 
The  Congress  began with an introductory report by Mr.Rumor 
in which  he  stressed the  "world-wide  implications"  of the  basic 
issues  and  underlying problems  of our time.  He  looked for 
"close co-operation between peoples"  to  stamp  out poverty in 
the  world  and  he  said that the  Christian Democrat  Party repudi-
ated any form  of racial discrimination or continental political 
monopoly,  either on  the  part of  individual States or any one 
social class. 
He  dwelt  on the  most  important political problems  facing 
the world  and discussed the Christian Democrat  attitude to  NATO 
and  t~ the  European  Community.  He  said that the  basic  options 
held out  "opportunities,  at once pluralistic and polycentric", 
in keeping with the  inherently democratic  structure of the 
western world.  In this connexion he  said that even if, as  had 
indeed been the case,  there was  a  temptation to return to  the 
pattern of inward-looking national  egotism,  the  West  had,  in 
its very nature,  original formulae  to satisfy the  legitimate 
requirements  of each individual nation provided this were  not 
prejudicial to other countries. 
He  expressed the conviction that the  idea of  a  Europe  that 
was  free~ united and  outward-looking was  too deeply entrenched 
in the  minds  of governments  and  the hearts of the peoples to  be 
east aside.  Mr.  Rumor  said that the  EEC  had promoted  the  sup-
ply-of-services potential of many  countries while at the  same 
time  many  of their structural weaknesses  were  edging towards  a 
solution:  these weaknesses  had  emerged  as  the result of  a  sud-
den  transformation of small markets  as· they give  way  to  a  new 
order of much  keener competition in a  larger industrial area. 
The  present crisis,  Mr.  Rumor  felt,  was  a  growth crisis.  In 
overcoming this crisis,  the  aim of the European Christian Demo-
crats, i.e. that steps be  taken towards political integration, 
assumed fresh relevance.  He  considered that the  action·taken 
by the  five  governments;  after France  had broken off the  dis-
cussions,  had been prudent  and  responsible  to the highest de-
gree.  He  felt that maintaining agreement  among  the  Five  was  a 
sine  qua  non if the efforts to resolve  the deadlock were  to be 
successful.  He  was  in favour of the  majority-voting principle 
on the Council  of Ministers.  It was  inconsistent with the  log-
ic of the  Communities  to  admit  of  any right of veto comparable 
to that obtaining at the  U.N.,  although it was  also in the  log-
ic of the  Community that none  would wish to prejudice  the vital 
interests of  one  or more  partners by exercising the  majority 
vote. 
On  the  other hand,  he  continued,  the  Commission proposals, 
whatever  one  might  feel  about their actual timing,  were  in 
- 4  -themselves  a  request for potential ~ewers:  one  had  only to 
think of  independent  revenues  from  the  levies  and  customs  du-
ties or the  demarcation line vis-a-vis third countries or·the 
arrangements  with regard to the  revenues  of the  Member  States. 
This  initiative represented the  emergence  of sovereign and  su-
pranational powers:  it also  meant  that the  dialectic  of facts 
was  of greater moment  than the dialectic of words.  With regard 
to  the  problem of the  powers  of  the  EEC  Commission,  that is of 
the  Executive  body,  now  soon to  be  merged with the  other Execu-
tives,  the powers  of  the European Parliament  assumed  immediate 
relevance.  It was  not  so  much  a  question of increasing its su-
pervisory powers  but rather,  in a  democratic  way,  of bringing 
into being a  body that was  representative  and  had constitution-
al and legislative powers  which  would  give  added  depth  to  the 
Community  in its representational  dimension. 
After Mr.  Rumor  had submitted his  report,  the  Congress  di-
vided its subsequent  discussions  between five  committees,  each 
dealing with  a  specific subject.  The  report  of  the first com-
mittee  on  "The  Development  of the  Community"  was  presented by 
Mr.  Fritz Hellwig,  a  member  of  the  ECSC  High Authority.  Dis-
cussing the  phase  the  Community  was  going through,  he  said that 
for  a  long time  economic  integration had been looked at  on  the 
basis of  two,  diametrically opposed,  assumptions:  the first 
was  that  economic  integration was  a  stepping stone,  to politi-
cal integration;  the  other,  put  forward  by France,  was  that  the 
prerogatives  of  the  Community bodies  should be  confined to  the 
economic  area,  i.e~ disregarding the need for  the  political in-
tegration others were  urging.  In looking for possible  solu-
tions to  the  present crisis,  Mr.  Hellwig said that between the 
two  extremes  of pessimism and  optimism,  a  half-way solution 
could be  found  which  took into  account  some  of  the  French de-
mands,  sueh as,  for  example,  those  concerning the  re-examina-
tion of  the  voting procedure  on the  Council  of Ministers  and 
the  status of  the  Commission.  A slower rate of economic  inte-
gration might  also  be  contemplated in individual sectors.  The 
speaker then referred to the  problems  of merging  the  Communi-
ties and  he  averred that the problem of  relations between the 
institutions was  one  that could not  be  shelvea indefinitely. 
The  report  of the  second committee  on  "Democracy in West-
ern and  Eastern Europe"  was  presented by Mr.  W.K.L.  Schmelzer, 
President of  the  K.W.M.  Group  in the  Second  Chamber  of  the· 
Dutch Parliament.  For Christian Democrats,  he  said,  democracy, 
while not  a  dogma,  was  the  system that best  guaranteed  a  re-
spect for and  the  realization of  the principles that should un-
derlie international life.  He  analyzed the  factors  liable to 
undermine  democracy in Europe  and he  outlined the  means  that 
could be  employed  to  influence the direction it took.  Inter 
alia,  he  stressed the  need  to  make  the  democratic  institutions 
less technocratic,  the  need for politicians ready,  in super-
vising the  policy of the  Government,  to restrict their atten-
tion to  essentials;  he  emphasized the  positive r8le  that the 
communication media,  especially television,  could play in pro-
viding  a  steady flow  of information about  European politics. 
- 5  -He  drew special  attention to  what  Christian Democrats  could do 
in this connexion,  especially in relations with the East Euro-
pean countries,  bringing  a  positive influence  to  bear on the 
development  of democracy. 
The  third committee  dealt with  relations between  "Demo-
cratic Europe  and Latin America"  (Rapporteur:  Mr.  Edoardo 
Martino,  Italy).  He  outlined the  background to  these relations, 
bedevilled as  they were  at present with controversies  and atti-
tudes  of preconceived hostility.  Despite  the  opposition of the 
Council  of Ministers,  it was  pertinent to stress the  need to 
co-ordinate  the  policies of the  EEC  States vis-a-vis the  Latin 
American States at the  European level.  What  individual  EEC 
States were  doing in the  various Latin American countries  was 
indeed valuable  but it could not  touch off the  acceleration in 
economic  development  and  social progress that was  called for. 
In recent  years,  he  went  on,  there  had been an  appreciable  in-
crease in trade  between the  two  areas:  Latin American  exports 
had  increased by  35 per cent  in the  four years  from  1958 to 
1962  - a  much  faster rate of growth  than that of world trade 
generally.  To  overcome  Latin America's difficulties on  the 
world market,  the speaker felt that three possible solutions 
suggested themselves: 
a.  an  expansion of domestic  demand  and  regional co-operation; 
b.  a  regional  programme  for Latin America  on  the part of the 
Community; 
c.  a  solution on  a  world-wide  scale. 
There  was,  however,  one  prerequisite for closer co-opera-
tion between the  two  communities:  Latin America  should  endeav-
our to  understand European problems  to  a  much  greater extent 
than it had  done  so  far. 
In conclusion he  said that those  who  taught that  Communism 
in Latin America  could be  defeated by giving support to mili-
tary adventures  or to the  most  scandalous  state  o·f  economic 
privilege that had ever existed,  had lost touch with reality. 
"We  are  convinced,"  he  said,  "that no  dictatorship,  whether 
left-wing or right-wing can solve  the  distressing problems  af-
flicting that continent.  At  present,  Europe  can offer some-
thing for the  consideration of  the  Latin American peoples  and 
their endeavours:  its experience  and  its solidarity." 
The  other two  committees dealt primarily with party busi-
ness.  These  reports  were  on co-operation between Christian 
Demoerats  and other currents of political opinion (report to  the 
fourth committee  by Mr.  Alain Poher,  President  of  the  Christian 
Democrat  Group  in the  European Parliament,  France)  and  on  "the 
activities and prospects  of the  EUCD"  (report to the  fifth 
committee  by Mr.  Leo  Tindemans,  Secretary-General  of the 
- 6  -EUCD,  Belgium). 
At  the  close  of  the  Congress,  a  resolution was  passed 
calling upon France  to return to the  European  Community  and  the 
other five  governments  (in which the  Christian  Democrats  had 
relative majorities)  to stand fast by the  Treaties  of  Rome  and 
go  on with  economic  integration.  In the  resolution the  Chris-
tian Democrat parties considered that the  Commission should re-
tain its independent powers,  that  the  Council  of Ministers 
should  adopt  the  majority-voting principle,  that the  European 
Parliament  should be  elected by universal  suffrage  and that 
there should be  closer economic  ties with third countries  and 
especially the  EFTA  countries.  It trusted that  there  would  be 
closer co-operation on defence .and  foreign policy,  joint action 
on behalf of  the  developing countries,  co-operation with  the 
Christian Democrat parties in Latin America  whom  Europe  could 
help by virtue  of its experience,  that it would  take  action on 
the  scientific, social,  economic  and cultural levels in its re-
lations with the  East  European countries  and lastly that there 
might  be  co-operation with all the  other democratic  movements 
that wanted  to build the United States  of  Europe.  (Il Popolo, 
10,  11,  12  and  13  December  1965) 
3.  Federal  Economics  Minister SchmUcker  and  Dr.  J.M.  den Uyl, 
Netherlands  Economics  Minister,  discuss  the  current situa-
tion of  the  EEC 
On  the  occasion of  the  60th anniversary of the  German-
Dutch  Chamber  of  Commerce,  Federal  Economics  Minister SchmUcker 
and his  Dutch colleague  addressed  an  extraordinary plenary ses-
sion in Amsterdam  on  the  aims  of the  EEC  and  the  situation in 
which it now  found  itself. 
11r.  SchmUcker  emphasized that the  great  economic  progress 
of post-war years  had been  achieved only with  the help  of the 
market  economy principle.  It was  essential therefore  to  con-
tinue  foll~wing this course  in the  years  to  come.  The  tra-
ditional  Dutch policy of  free  trade  would  continue  to  receive 
the  enthusiastic  support  of the Federal  Government. 
Mr.  SchmUcker  warned against  using trade  relations with the 
Eastern bloc  in order to  indulge  in reciprocal  overtrumping  of 
credit  terms.  This  would certainly not  be  in the  interests of 
Western countries.  The  Kennedy  Round  should  lead not  only to 
reductions  in duties but  also  to  further abolition of various 
practices  that were  bringing discredit  to  international trade. 
Stability and  sound  economic  policy must  be  accompanied by an 
efficient currency system.  The  first need was  to  tighten up 
monetary discipline  and  avoid drawn-out  imbalances  in payments. 
Turning  to  the  adverse  German  balance  of  payments,  Mr.  SchmUcker 
- 7-observed that high  imports  under current  economic  conditions 
ensured  a  necessary and desirable  increase in domestic  supply. 
He  warned,  however,  that  a  protracted shortage  in Germany's 
production could be  a  danger for the  EEC  as  a  whole  if pressure 
on the  Community's  production potential again  showed  a  sub-
stantial increase.  He  reiterated the  Federal  Government's  ap-
peal for  a  common  short-term economic  policy with built-in 
long-term facilities for  the  shaping of  an overall  economic 
policy.  Turning to the  current crisis,  Mr.  SchmUcker pointed 
out that the  Community's  achievements  to date  could not  be  sur-
rendered without  damage  to all Member  States.  The  present 
difficulties must  be  surmounted within the  framework  of  the 
EEC  Treaty and  of the  existing Community institutions. 
Dr.  J.M.  den  Uyl  (Socialist)  emphasized that  economic 
growth and  the  establishment of  the  EEC  had  given  a  powerful 
stimulus  to  the  traditional  economic  unity of  Germany  and  the 
Netherlands.  There  was  not,  in his  opinion,  a  country in the 
Community that had not profited by this market  expansion.  He 
regarded the  investments  of industry as  a  positive factor for 
the  continued expansion of the  Common  Market.  It was  incon-
ceivable that  Member  States would  tighten up  national fron-
tiers again as  this would bring the  Kennedy  Round  to  a  stand-
still and indefinitely shelve satisfactory solution of  inter-
national trade policy p~oblems.  The  unsuccessful  attempts  of 
the  former  OEEC  had already shown  that a  supranational solution 
was  essential to  reconcile national  clashes  of interests. 
"This  idea was  rooted in the  concept  of a  politically united 
Europe  to which  we  must  hold fast."  Dr.  J.M.  den  Uyl  wound  up 
his address  by pointing out  that in addition to  a  common  shor~ 
term economic  policy,  a  co-ordinated structural policy - in-
cluding an agricultural policy,  energy policy,  etc.  - would 
have  to be  hammered  out.  (Industriekurier,  20  November  1965) 
4.  Committee for Economic  and Social 
a  united Euro  e 
The  International Executive  of the  CEPES  met  in Rome  on 
7  December under the  chairmanship  of Professor Vittorio 
Valletta.  It unanimously passed the  following five-point 
statement  summing  up  the situation in the  Community,  and 
stressing the  need to  go  on with the making  of  Europe: 
"1)  Recent  events have  left no  doubt  as  to the  seriousness  of 
the  crisis the  European Economic  Community is now  going 
through.  At  such a  critical juncture, it is vital to 
avoid injecting any bitterness into the  discussions  now  in 
progress,  to  remember  the  benefits that the  making  of 
Europe  can bring to each of the Six countries  and  to  sug-
gest  ways  of breaking the  vicious circle in which  the Six 
are  now  locked. 
- 8  -2)  In view of the  foregoing,  the  CEPES  Executive is convinced 
that the peoples  of Europe  will not be  able  to  achieve 
maximum  economic  and social progress until they become 
united;  only a  united Europe  will enable  the  States con-
cerned to exercise  an influence in world affairs that is 
commensurate  with their collective potential.  The  enthu-
siasm for European ideals,  engendered  among  the younger 
generation must,  moreover,  not be  turned to disappoint-
ment. 
3)  For these  reasons,  the  CEPES  considers it necessary: 
a)  that there  should be  no  thought  of  abandoning the  pur-
suit of political unification.  To  achieve this common 
goal,  all those  concerned will have  to  make  the  neces-
sary concessions while ·respecting the  identity of  each 
individual country; 
b)  that the  establishment of  common  policies  (for trade, 
agriculture,  etc.)  should be  accelerated,  for these 
alone  justify a  new  thrust forward  towards  complete 
integration and the  efforts  so  far made  in terms  of 
tariffs; 
c)  that the future  development  of the  Customs  Union should 
be  effectively controlled so  that it keeps  pace with 
integration and  the  approximation of  economic  policies. 
4)  In this connexion,  a  number  of things  have  to  be  done  si-
multaneously;  any attempt  to  do  these things  separately 
would  be prejudicial both to  the  spirit and  to  the  letter 
of  the  Treaty of Rome,  viz: 
i) to establish the  bases  of  a  common  external trade 
policy and  gradually to  ensure its application; 
ii) to bring the  common  labour  and  capital markets  into 
operation,  while  guaranteeing the free  movement  of 
persons,  services  and capital; 
iii) to finalize  the  common  agricultural policy; 
iv)  to  approximate national  short-term economic,  mone-
tary and  credit policies; 
v)  to finalize  the  approximation of fiscal systems,  be-
ginning with turnover taxes  and  indirect taxation, 
as  laid down  in Article  99  of the  Treaty; 
vi)  to  guarantee fair competitive conditions  through  a 
common  policy to  enable  firms  to adjust to new  mar-
ket conditions  (internal re-organization,  co-opera-
tion,  concentrations); 
vii) to  approximate  company  laws  and  examine  whether  a 
new  set of articles of association is called for; 
- 9  -viii) achieve better co-ordination between aid given by 
the  Community  to developing countries  and aid ema-
nating directly from  individual  Member  States,  and 
thereby achieve  the  greatest possible effectiveness; 
ix) to  step up  co-operation in scientific research, 
technological  progress  and foreign investments. 
5)  In the  longer term,  the  CEPES  Executive  does  not  think 
that  merely to  achieve  the  Common  Market  can be  regarded 
as  the  ultimate  objective of  European unification.  The 
final  aim should be  to  create  a  Community Power,  which 
should be  endowed  with specific powers  with respect to  de-
fence  and  foreign policy.  (Agenzia  Europa Unita,  7  Decem-
ber 1965) 
5.  Mr.  G.  Martino  on  the  structure of  the  Treaties  as  a  guar-
antee  of European unity 
By  agreeing to  the principle  of  modifying or rev1s1ng the 
Treaty of  Rome  one  would  be  confronted with certain dangers. 
For it was  only the  structure of the  Treaty that  guaranteed 
that the  ultimate  end  of the  integration process,  that is the 
complete  economic  and political unification of the  Six coun-
tries would  not  be betrayed. 
These  statements were  made  in Forli by Mr.  Gaetano  Martino, 
member  of the  European Parliament  and  former Italian Minister 
of Foreign Affairs,  in a  speech  on the current situation in the 
EEC.  Mr.  Martino felt that to  abandon or betray this ultimate 
aim,  by agreeing to the  proposed  amendments  to  the  present  Trea-
ties, would  be  tantamount  to  abdicating any reason for  living 
in order to  live.  It was  impossible  to accept this.  The  Trea-
ties had  to  be  adhered  to for they represented  a  solemn under-
taking which  the peoples  of the Six countries had  assumed 
through the  ratification of  the  Treaties by their respective 
Parliaments  and  they called for their strict application,  with-
out  impatience  and without  concessions. 
Referring to the  appeal that the  EEC  Council  of Ministers 
had made  to the French  Government  on  26  October,  which had  so 
far met  with no  response,  he  said that the  common  agricultural 
policy was  not  the  real reason for the  controversy:  this had 
simply brought it out into  the  open.  In actual fact,  the dif-
ference  between  them  was  political;  to  solve it France  was  ask-
ing for the  Treaties to  be  revised completely. 
Above  all,  France  wanted to  "clip the  wings"  of the  Exec-
utive  Commission  and to  eliminate  the majority voting rule at 
the deliberations of  the  Council  of Ministers,  a  rule which  was 
- 10 -scheduled,  as  from  1  Januar~to take  the  place  of  the  unanimity 
rule which had been in force  so  far.  Such were  the precondi-
tions upon which France  would  agree  to  accept  the invitation ex-
tended to her by the Five. 
But if the structure of the  Treaties were  amended  in any 
way,  this would  be  tantamount  to denaturing them  and it would 
make  them worthless.  Hence,  Mr.  Martino  stressed the  need to 
stick to  the Treaties as  they stood if the  ultimate  objective 
of European political and  economic  integration were  not  to be 
betrayed.  (Agenzia  Europa Unita,  1  December  1965) 
6.  Franz-Josef Strauss  addresses  the  European  Economic  Union 
on European policy 
Franz-Josef Strauss,  CSU  Chairman,  addressing the  European 
Economic  Union  (UNEUROP)  in the  Milan  Chamber  of  Commerce  on 
3  December 1965,  called for  a  "forward in Europe"  policy. 
Mr.  Strauss  argued that West  Berlin should be  invested 
with European functions  and that  the  European Communities  should 
set up  "liaison offices" in West  Berlin for negotiations with 
countries  of  the  Eastern bloc. 
Speaking in Milan,  Mr.  Strauss stated that  "Washington 
would  do  well  to  encourage  the  British to  collaborate with 
France  in the  manufacture  of nuclear arms  with a  view to build-
ing the nucleus  of  a  European  atomic  force."  The  idea of  a 
NATO  without  France  was  "a blow at Europe's security".  Wash-
ington could support  a  Franco-British nuclear policy by making 
available  the  technical  "know-how"  of  the  USA.  "The  Federal  Re-
public  and  Italy would  no  longer feel  pushed into  the  background 
in this sphere  o.nce  the basis for  a  European nuclear strike 
force  had been created in the  form  of  a  Franco-British arsenal." 
The  n6tion that Britain could one  day  assume  France's place 
in the  EEC  spelt  "the  end  of any European policy".  A basis for 
European unity could only be  laid by working out with Paris  a 
common  approach to  defence  as  an essential part of  a  European 
foreign policy.  The  possibility of incorporating the  French nu-
clear force  in a  European organization had for  some  years been 
lightly hinted at in Paris. 
To  ~vercome the present NATO  cr1s1s,  Mr.  Strauss  recom-
mended  a  new  form  of  co-ordination between American units on 
European soil and  a  future  European defence  organization.  "The 
supreme  command  of  a  European defence  community would naturally 
have  to  be  in the hands  of a  European.  I  should have  no 
- 11  -hesitation in entrusting it to  a  Frenchman;  if Great  Britain 
later decides  to pool its nuclear potential with that of  France 
in order to  join such  an organization,  Frenchmen  and English-
men  might  perhaps  take  the  supreme  command  over in turn." 
Mr.  Strauss felt that  France  owed  its nuclear strike force 
in part to its membership  of the  EEC.  He  warned against the 
co-existence  of national States  and  of premature supranational 
institutions.  "Our political programme  should not  be  wholly 
taken up  by considerations of defence.  It must  be  geared first 
and  foremost  to  a  positive task- to ensure  our peoples•  sur-
vival within  a  larger bloc still to  be  created." 
Within the  context  of  such  a  "forward in Europe"  policy, 
it seemed likely that  Germany's  desire for reunification would 
no  longer be  expressed in terms  of national restoration.  "We 
Germans  must  grasp the  fact that the vital interests of  every 
one  of us  coincide with those  of all those  Europeans  whose  com-
mon  task it is to create for themselves  a  political and  econom-
ic area on  a  completely new  scale."  The  German  people  should 
therefore cease  to regard their tragic lack of unity as  an  iso-
lated problem but view the  division of their country in terms 
of a  Europe  partitioned in the  middle.  Such  an  approach to the 
problem could serve  as  a  basis for an  active West  European pol-
icy towards  Eastern Europe.  This  could only be  successful,  how-
ever, if it was  pursued by a  strong West  European  Community. 
Bilateral relations between East  and  West  would  only be  of 
value  on the basis of  a  co-ordinated West  European policy. 
Any  European country that tried'to  "go it alone"  would  tend 
to become  isolated and be  doomed  to failure where  its vital in-
terests were  concerned.  The  example  of  France  demonstrated that 
it was  no  longer possible,  at national level,  to create facil-
ities for even  a  limited political freedom  of  movement.  Turning 
to the  drive for European unity,  Mr.  Strauss pointed out that 
Rome  was  not built in a  day  and that Europe  could not  be united 
by means  of the  Rome  Treaties alone,  even  in decades.  It was 
also partly up  to  the  Italians  and  Germans  to  "demand  for our 
continent those  rudimentary bases  for a  positive,  forward-look-
ing development  already contained in French policy,  by standing 
up for  a  European defence  community within the  Atlantic Alliance, 
for West  European unity of  action towards  the  East  and  a  common 
policy towards  Africa.  Let  us not shun France",  concluded 
Mr.  Strauss,  "but take her in our midst.
11  (Die  Welt,  4  Decem-
ber 1965;  Industriekurier,  4  December 1965) 
- 12  -7.  Professor  R~pke,  Genevan  economist,  on European integration 
Professor Wilhelm  R~pke,  Genevan  economist,  in an  address 
delivered at  the  Antropos  Institute in St.  Augustine  (near Bonn) 
on 8  December 1965,  had  some  critical things to  say about cur-
rent efforts to bring a  supranational  Europe  into being. 
He  warned against  overestimating what  could be  achieved 
along economic  lines,  and  labelled as  a  fallacy of  an  economic 
theory the belief that political union would necessarily emerge 
from  economic  integration.  The  present issue was  how  to set 
about,  at regional  level,  surmounting national sovereignty by 
introducing real forms  of supranational organization.  This 
called for considerable tact and circumspection.  If,  despite 
all obstacles, political integration was  achieved by economic 
means,  this would  be  a  mighty achievement.  "It would be  the 
first time  that  a  supranational union - in itself a  miracle,  or 
bordering on  a  miracle  - had come  into being at the  lowest  stage 
of integration- the  economic.  This," Professor  R~pke observ-
ed with heavy irony,  "would be  equivalent to achieving union be-
tween France  and  Germany  on the basis  of their trade in 
Kaloderma  and  Camembert." 
Such  a  possibility - he  went  on  - should not  however be 
ruled out.  But  a  supranational State must  be  more  than a  cus-
toms  union or a  cartel authority.  "What  is required is a  commu-
nity consciousness  springing from  deep  moral  roots.  Switzer-
land,  so  often held up  as  a  model  for European union,  did not 
emerge  from  the  merging of  cantonal cheese-factories in the  Mid-
dle Ages."  Its political structure stems  for the political will 
of free  burghers  and  peasants to  assert themselves.  Given  a 
structure such  as  the  European Economic  Community  as  the first 
stage  towards  political union,  one  could not fall back on any 
one  political model.  Professor  R~pke went  on to  say that the 
German  Customs  Union  could not  be  regarded  as  a  historical prec-
edent.  He  then referred to his  Cologne  colleague,  Professor 
MUller-Armack,  who  had described the  proposal  to  merge  the na-
tions of Eqrope  into  one  State as utterly Utopian.  Professor 
Rtlpke  could not  moreover see that anything would  be  gained by 
replacing national patriotism by patriotism of  a  supranational 
kind. 
In  hi~ view,  a  great many  economic  difficulties were  due  to 
the  breakdown  of  "meta-economic  conditions".  Even  international 
trade was  no  longer based  on the  theory of comparative costs but 
ultimately on the  broader principle that treaties should be  re-
spected. 
Professor  R~pke showed  some  understanding for  General  de 
Gaulle's  European policy.  If de  Gaulle  was  holding back the 
- 13  -EEC's  development,  this reflected the feeling in France,  "as  th~ 
French have  not  experienced the  trauma  of nationalism like the 
Germans."  (Frankfurter Allgemeine  Zeitung,  9  December  1965; 
Handelsblatt,  9  December 1965) 
8.  Professor Mliller-Armack's  memorandum  on future  European in-
tegration 
At  the beginning of  December 1965,  Professor Mliller-Armack, 
the  Cologne  economist  and  former Secretary of State in the Fed-
eral  German  Ministry of  Economics,  sent  a  memorandum  on European 
policy to  leading politicians of the  day. 
In his view,  purely economic  facts  could be  used to  impart 
meaning to  European co-operation;  moreover,  a  more  modest,  con-
stitutional approach of this kind  made  it easier for neutral 
EFTA  countries  to  unite with the  EEC.  Neither of the  two  blocs 
would  be  injured in this way,  although such co-operation would 
lead to  a  larger European market.  For the  purposes  of  economic 
co-operation between the  EEC  and  EFTA,  Professor Mliller-Armack 
advocated an  "outline"  treaty as  well  as  the  abolition of cus-
toms  barriers between the  two  blocs,  a  European short-term eco-
nomic  policy,  a  budget policy,  investment  and  research policy, 
a  common  European  transport system,  and co-ordination of devel-
opment  policy and policy on trade with  the  Eastern countries. 
The  task of the  Federal  Government  was  to  act as  an inter-
mediary,  for which purpose it would have  to work  out  a  fresh ap-
proach to the continued pursuit of European unification.  More-
over,  the  Bonn plans  must  take  French requirements  into account. 
In this connexion,  Professor Mliller-Armack in no  way  regarded 
the  French desire to  revise  the  provisions  of  the  EEC  Treaty on 
majority decisions  as  misguided.  The  notion of  some  specialists 
in constitutional law that Europe  could be  welded  into  a  single 
State on the basis  of majority decisions  was  unrealistic because 
on vital questions  a  majority decision would  be  accepted by no 
one.  Technical  questions  and problems  concerning co-ordination 
of  economic  policy could,  on the  other hand,  be  made  into  a  list 
on which majority decisions would be possible. 
Any  German  initiative for the  pursuit of European integra-
tion should take France's special interests into account  so  as 
to facilitate the overall process  of unification of Europe;  at 
the  same  time  the wishes  of the  other States should not be ig-
nored.  It was  essential therefore  to  negotiate  a  bargain by ac-
cepting certain of  General  de  Gaulle's concepts  and  demands  in 
return for his  agreement  to  a  European solution for union with 
EFTA.  One-sided concessions,  on the  other hand,  would  amount 
to  an undignified retreat. 
- 14 -Before  the  Federal  Government  put  forward  concrete propos-
als for European policy,  France  must first define its attitude 
more  clearly.  Turning to  the merger of the  ECSC,  EEC  and 
Euratom Treaties,  Professor MUller-Armack declared that it would 
provide  an opportunity of clarifying two  critical issues - the 
change  in the  method  of voting and  the  enlargement  of  the  Commu-
nity. 
According to Professor MUller-Armack,  the voting procedures 
laid down  in the  Rome  Treaty were  too  complicated.  In his view, 
the  French demand  for a  unanimous  vote  on all vital questions 
was  also  in line with  German  interests.  Should any change  be 
made  to  the  Treaties,  however,  it was  essential to ensure that 
the principle of unanimity was  not  misused contrary to  the  mean-
ing and clear wording of  the  TFeaty~ for  example  by opposing the 
entry of  a  new  member  to  the  EEC.  ~Die Welt,  15  December  1965) 
9.  Banker Abs  on European policy 
Banker Abs,  Chairman of the  Board of Governors  of the 
Deutsche.Bank,  in an  address  to  the  European  Luncheon  Club  in 
London  on 2  November  1965,  stated that the  EEC  could not dis-
pense with France  in pursuing its economic  and  political objec-
tives.  At  the  same  time,  he  opposed  any revision of the  Rome 
Treaty and  spoke  out in favour  of  strengthening political co-
operation between the Six and widening the powers  of the Europe-
an Parliament  in Strasbourg.  So  long as  France  declined to co-
operate,  attempts  to pursue these  objectives  appeared hopeless. 
Dr.  Abs  suggested that there should be  a  gentleman's  agreement 
under which particularly important decisions would  have  to be 
taken unanimously for a  certain period,  even after the  majority 
rules came  into force  in 1966.  Such  a  procedure  would not be  in 
conflict with the provisions of the  Rome  Treaties.  As  regards 
the problem of liquidity,  there would  be  no  point in discarding 
the  existing key currencies  as  this would  merely weaken the In-
ternational Monetary Fund.  Nor  did Dr.  Abs  approve  of  the crea-
tion of  an artificial international currency;  in his  opinion na-
tional currencies  were  more  suitable for the maintenance  of ade-
quate naticnal liquidity. 
In an address  to the  Antwerp  branch of the  Banque  de  Paris 
et des  Pays-Bas,Dr.  Abs  remarked that it was  impossible  to have 
a  supranational currency without  a  supranational policy.  He  did 
not,  however,  rule  out  any possibility of the creation of  a  spe-
cial international  ~~r~~cy unit some  time  in the  future.  The 
effects of  introducing such  a  currency unit alongside  the  lead-
ing currencies - dollar and  pound  sterling - should not  however 
be  overestimated.  Moreover,  no  country in Europe  at present 
possessed the potential needed for  a  European-scale  key curren-
cy.  Moreover,  even  an international currency bank could only 
operate really successfully if international  governments  and  an 
- 15 -international parliament were  in existence. 
Dr.  Abs  then raised the  question whether steps should al-
ready be  taken in anticipation of  a  surrender of what  had been 
achieved in the  Common  Market;  his personal view was  that the 
negative attitude of  one  country had  gone  so  far that  the  ex-
traordinary enthusiasm of recent years  was  now  on the  ebb.  "The 
EEC  countries  must  now  hold fast  to the  Treaty to preserve what-
ever can still be preserved."  The  EEC  was  inconceivable without 
a  common  agricultural policy,  but this should not  be  made  a  pre-
text for holding up  inte3ration in other sectors. 
In the  latest issue of  "Wirtschaftliche Mitteilungen"  of 
the  Deutsche  Bank  on  the  EEC's  future,  Dr.  Abs  once  again advo-
cates forging  ahead with European integration.  Countries  that 
are not prepared to  see  the  substance  of the  Rome  Treaty weak-
ened must  be  in a  position to hold on- in essential matters  -
to what  had already been achieved.  The  writer refuses to  enter-
tain the possibility that a  State now  belonging to the  EEC  can 
be  replaced by one  at present not  a  member.  But  provisional ar-
rangements  existed to  enable countries in favour  of continued 
integration to  conclude  special agreements  with States at pre-
sent outside the EEC.  Such  arrangements  cannot  of course  ever 
take  the  place  of the  ultimate  objective  - the  complete  integra-
tion of  the Six in the  Common  Market.  The  geographic  expansion 
of the  EEC  also  implies  a  measure  of supranational  sovereignty, 
which is essential if the  Community is to  operate satisfacto-
rily.  The  position of the  EEC  Commission  should not  therefore 
be  weakened  on  any account.  (FAZ,  31  December 1965;  VWD-Europa, 
3  and 8  November 1965) 
10.  Address  by the President of the  Federal Association of  Ger-
man  Industry on European questions 
On  6  December 1965  Mr.  Fritz Berg,  President of  the  Federal 
Association of  German  Industry (BDI),  spoke  on  European  ques-
tions at  a  dinner given by the  Foreign Press Association in Lon-
don. 
Mr.  Berg observed that industry troughout  the world was  at 
present in a  difficult situation.  The  present period was  one  of 
radical  change  with  a  growing trend towards  vast  economic  blocs 
- EEC,  EFTA,  Latin American Free  Trade  Area - closer world-wide 
.economic  co-operation,  e.g.  the  Kennedy· Round:· 'B.Ild  t·rade  with the 
Eastern countries,development  aid  and  improvement  of  the  Bretton 
Woods  Agreement.  From  Germany's  point  of view special  im-
portance  attached to  the  overcoming  of  the  EEC  crisis and  the 
introduction of stabilizing factors  in the  domestic  economy,par-
ticularly by checking sharply risen labour costs.  Economic  prog-
ress  in and  outside  Europe  would  mark  time  as  a  result of  the 
- 16 -deadlock within the  EEC.  Mr.  Berg stated that the  idea of inte-
gration should on no  account be  imperilled.  Obstacles  arising 
from  the  integration process itself should not  always  be  regard-
ed as  tantamount  to  a  step back.  The  successes of the  EEC, 
which  German  industry regarded as  an  outward-looking Community, 
were  manifest for all to see.  For its part,  the  BDI  had  done 
all in its power to  enable  Great  Britain to enter the  Common 
Market  and  would continue  to pursue this goal.  The  crisis with-
in the  European  Economic  Community  would  have  to be  overcome  by 
mid-1966  in view of the  time-limit for the  American  "Trade  Ex-
pansion Act".  The  Kennedy  Round  in turn offered a  chance  of 
bridging the  gap  between the  EEC  and  EFTA.  Mr.  Berg emphasized 
that failure  would weaken  the Atlantic alliance,  thwart  the 
hopes  of  the  developing countries,  and  threaten GATT's  exist-
ence. 
In this  connexion,  Mr.  Berg favoured  reciprocal  agreements 
on special questions  such  as credit policy in trade with the 
Eastern countries.  He  emphasized that  German  industry would 
pursue  a  liberal policy towards  foreign  investments  and  imports 
and reject State  control~easures. 
In an address  on 10 December  1965 before the  South-West-
phalian Chamber  of  Industry and  Trade  in Hagen,  Mr.  Berg stress-
ed the  determination of industry to  go  ahead with the  task of 
uniting Europe.  The  initial objective  remained  a  customs  and 
economic  community of  the  Six.  Over  and  above  this,  German  in- . 
dustry wished to help  to  narrow the  gap  between the  EEC  and  EFTA 
and  to turn the  EEC  - as  an  outward-looking Community  - into  an 
effective instrument  of Atlantic partnership.  He  called for  as 
rapid a  solution as possible  of  the  European crisis.  (Indus-
triekurier,  7 December 1965;  VWD-Europa,  10  December  1965) 
11.  Dr.  Alwin  Mtinchmeyer,  Vice-President  of  the  Conference  of 
German  Industry and  Commerce,  on  Common  Market  questions 
Dr.  Mtinchmeyer,  Vice-President  of  the  Conference  of  German 
Industry  a~d Commerce  and President  of  the  Permanent  Conference 
of the  EEC  Chambers  of  Industry and  Commerce,  speaking at the 
28th plenary session of  the  Permanent  Conference  in Brussels  on 
23  November  1965,  argued that the  EEC  countries should not  op-
pose  a  common  interpretation of  the  EEC  Treaty provisions  on the 
adoption of majority decisions.  He  was  sure that even in the 
third stage  of the  Common  Market  "political sense"  would prevail 
and  that the  EEC  States would not  outvote  each other in the 
Council  of Ministers  on matters  of vital interest as  such  a  tri-
al of strength could  lead to counter-moves  by an outvoted State 
when  the  next opportunity arose.  Dr.  Mtinchmeyer  felt that as  the 
Common  Market progressed,  greater caution should be  exercised as 
regards  the  EEC  Commission.  He  felt  sure that the  framers  of 
the  EEC  Treaty were  fully aware  of the relatively strong and 
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vis the national Governments.  They  had worked  on  the  assumption 
that without  such  a  driving force  the  integration of several 
different  economies  could not  be  achieved.  Before  any limita-
tion of  the  Commission's  powers  was  contemplated,  the  whole 
question would  have  to be  thoroughly reviewed,  particularly as 
it appeared that since the  start of  the  1965 crisis the  EEC  Com-
mission would mainly concentrate  on  economic  integration.  Dr. 
Mlinchmeyer  regretted the  limited scope  available to  industrial 
and business circles to help in solving the crisis.  Everything 
would  however be  done  to  influence  the  national  Governments  so 
as  to  ensure  that the  process  of European integration was  again 
got  under way. 
A communique  issued by the Permanent  Conference  of the  EEC 
Chambers  of Industry and  Commerce  stressed that balanced devel-
opment  of the  Community called for the  simultaneous  completion 
of both the  agricultural  and  the  industrial market.  The  Govern-
ments  of the six EEC  States were  called upon  to enter into fresh 
negotiations  with  a  view to  overcoming the  EEC  crisis.  On  no 
ac.count  should anything that had  so  far been achieved be  imper-
illed.  The  Chambers  of  Industry and  Commerce  were  determined to 
go  ahead with their efforts and  to  contribute to  the  balanced 
development  of the  Common  Market. 
At  a  conference  of the  Bayrische  Staatsbank in Augsburg on 
25  November  1965,  Dr.  MUnchmeyer  described continuous  and bal-
anced growth  of  the Federal Republic's  external  trade  commit-
ments  as vital to  the  economy as  a  whole.  The  overcoming of  the 
EEC  crisis was  essential for satisfactory development  of  German 
external trade.  Dr.  Mtinchmeyer  felt that before  any efforts 
were  made  to reach  a  compromise,  the political prerequisites 
for  the  integration and future political pattern of Europe 
would have  to  be clarified. 
His  observations  on  EEC  policy fell  under  two  main heads: 
1.  Absolute priority had to be  given to  the  overcoming of the 
EEC  crisis.  The  first step would  be  to clarify the  polit-
ical prerequisites for the  integration and future political 
pattern of Europe.  The  difficulty of these negotiations 
should not  be  further aggravated by formal  considerations 
of prestige. 
2.  Once  the  EEC  has  regained its ability to negotiate,  it must 
spare  no  effort to  ensure that  customs  negotiations in  GATT 
- at present held  up  - are  again pushed ahead with·.  Fail-
ure  of these negotiations  would  have  grave  consequences  for 
the  German  economy.  The  question of building a  bridge be-
tween  EFTA  and  the  EEC  also called for  a  prom~t solution. 
(VWD-Europa,  23  November  and  25  November  1965) 
- 18 -12.  Mr.  Linthorst Homan  and  European integration 
At  a  press  conference  given  on 10  December 1965 at the 
Netherlands  Office of the European  Communities'  Information 
Service  in The  Hague,  Mr.  Linthorst Homan,  a  member  of the  High 
Authority,  outlined his  views  on European integration problems: 
"The  need to re-cast Europe  in a  new  mould  compels  us  to  con-
tinue vigorously the boldest task we  have  undertaken,  that is 
the  task of  the  Six;  but  we  must  try to  improve  the  economic, 
social,  legal  and political structure,  for this is  a  prerequi-
site.  Only on this condition will the  work  of  the  Six be  con-
structive in its effects for  Europe  itself - and  Europe will 
have  to  assume  greater dimensions  than the  over-restrictive 
ones  of the Six- and  from  the.standpoint  of  efforts to  achieve 
sufficient cohesion,  enough  specialization and  an  adequate 
legal system at  the  world level.  It will also  serve  as  an  ex-
ample  to  those  endeavouring to  form  regional  groupings  else-
where." 
He  said that the  Six's only raison  d'~tre was  that they had 
agreed to play the part of pioneers for Europe.  This  emerged 
clearly from  the  Treaties  and their Preambles.  The  requests 
made  in 1961  and  1963  by countries that originally disagreed 
with their views  to  accede  to  the  Community,  justified them in 
their undertaking.  If ever the-Six were  diverted or if they 
strove after political ends  at odds  with those  of  other States 
in the  Atlantic world,  their co-operation would  lose its raison 
d'etre.  The  economic  and social prospects that the  Treaties af-
forded  could not  be  capitalized if the methods  employed  lacked 
the  dynamism  of the  EEC  or if the Six became  politically iso-
lated from  the rest of  the  Atlantic world.  It was  a  form  of 
self-deception to  hope  otherwise. 
The  need for  a  structural policy transcending national 
frameworks  became  more  urgent every day.  If the Community could 
work  out  a  structural policy appropriate for heavy industry, it 
would be well  on  the  way.  If it failed the  economic  and social 
foundations  of the  whole  European integration process would  be 
undermined.  Considerable  problems  had to  be  solved now  that the 
production~ sales  and  consumer patterns of the  world became  more 
clearly defined.  This  was  anothe·r reason why  the  crisis was  un-. 
fortunate,  for in industry and in the  professions  people  had to 
know  what  they could expect  from  a  sustained drive  to modernize, 
for substantial investment  was  involved~ 
Mr.  Linthorst  Homan  outlined the  trade policy measures  tak-
en by the  ECSC;  thanks  to a  better understanding  on  the  part of 
the peoples  concerning European integration, it was  now  general-
ly realized that the  coal  and  steel sectors could not  be  fully 
integrated without  a  customs  and  economic  union that was  at 
least as  tightly-knit as  that which  the  EEC  was  to become.  "The 
integration of a  given  area is only possible if the  whole  area 
- 19 -has its own  individual character.  The  "Europe  of sectors" has 
no  better chance  than the  "Europe  of nation States" - simply a 
juxtaposition of national  economies  - of bringing about terri-
torial integration."  Throughout  Europe  the coal industry was 
faced with particularly serious structural problems.  Subsidies 
to  mining firms  in some  ECSC  countries totalled considerable 
sums  which  proved just how  artificial the present  economic  and 
social situation had become.  The  Treaty structure,  which dated 
from 1950-1951,  was  no  longer in key  and since the  Council re-
fused in 1959 to  endow  the  High Authority with special powers, 
it had been  a  time  of uncertainty until 1964.  When  the  present 
political crisis had been  overcome,  it would be  necessary to 
get to work fast. 
- 20  -II. ECONOMIC  POLICY  AND  ECONOMIC  SECTORS 
1. 
At  a  meeting held to discuss  the  outcome  of  a  recent con-
gress in Warsaw,  the  CISL  Secretariat issued a  communique  stat-
ing that the  CGIL  as  a  whole  and  the Socialist delegates in 
particular had made  praiseworthy efforts to  promote  moves  to-
wards  the syndicalization of the  WFTU. 
With  regard to the part that the  CGIL  aspired to play in 
Europe,  the  CISL  felt that  eve~ the attitude recently adopted 
by the  CGIL  could  only be  taken into consideration if the fol-
lowing two  essential conditions were  met:  the  CGIL  must  sever 
its association with the  WFTU,  in compliance with  the  express 
wish of the socialist movement,  and  the  CGIL  must  pledge its 
support for the  Treaties  of  Rome  and Paris in the  same  way  as 
all the political and  trade union movements  collaborating in 
the  making  of Europe. 
The  affiliation of an  organization that was  hostile  to 
European integration in the non-Communist  countries,  and,  in 
fact,  concerned solely with the  development  of the  Communist 
society and the strategy of their struggle  in the  non-Communist 
countries,  was  obviously incompatible with  a  process  of European 
integration which  the  CGIL  delegation in Warsaw  had  judged to  be 
irreversible. 
The  second condition could not  be  regarded as  discriminat-
ory or prejudicial to  the practical action that the  CGIL  intend-
ed to  take  in Europe.  Yet  the  full  acceptance  of the  Treaties 
that founded  the  Communities  was  a  sine  qua  non,  if the  CGIL 
were  to  be  accepted in the  Community  at any level.  (CISL  -
Press Release) 
2.  Co-operation between the  French C.G.T.  Union  and  the Ital-
ian C.G.I.L.  Union 
The  executives  of the  French  "Confederation Generale  du 
Travail",  which has  a  large  Communist  membership  and  the  Italian 
"Confederazione  Generale Italiana del  Lavoro"  which  incorporates 
Communist  and  left-wing Socialist workers,  met  in Rome  on  25  and 
26  November.  On  26  November  they issued a  joint statement  on 
"Defending the  interests of  the worker in Western Europe."  In 
this statement the  C.G.T.  and  the  C.G.I.L.  declared that  they 
were  ready,  "at any time,  to hold discussions with  the  union 
Executives  affiliated to  the C.I.S.C.  (International Confedera-
- 21  -tion of Christian Trade  Unions)  to  work  out  the  bases  of an 
agreement  on all the practical problems  arising in connexion 
with defending,  together,  the  interests of the worker in West-
ern Europe." 
This  was  addressed to European democratic  unions.  The  two 
unions  then put  forward  the  idea of  a  common  front  of all un-
ions  in the  Common  Market  and  claimed the  right to be  represent-
ed in the  Community bodies.  "In view of the  increasingly close 
understanding between monopolies  at the  expense  of  the  inter-
ests of the  worker and  in view of the measures  to co-ordinate 
governments  economic policies, it is essential for the union 
organizations  in the six EEC  States to form  a  common  front.  Un-
der present conditions,  however,  the  C.G.T.  and  the  C.G.I.L.  are 
being discriminated against in a  prejudicial way,especially at 
the level of the  EEC  institutions.  The  workers  in France  and 
Italy are not all represented on them." 
The  two  unions,  while  retaining the right to their own 
opinions  on  everything connected with the  Common  Market  and rec-
ognizing the  right of the  other union executives,claim the right 
to be  represented in the  Community  bodies  in order to  act,  with-
in the  framework  of the powers  allotted to the unions  under the 
Treaty of  Rome,in  the  defence  of the  interests of the worker. 
Their participation will not  simply be the  recognitio~ of a 
legitimate right; it is also essential if the  working classes in 
the Six countries are to be represented in full strength'.  This 
can not but contribute to the  achievement of a  united union 
front,  not only at the  level of the  EEC  institutions but also  in 
its action against the  monopolies  of ·the Six countries concern-
ed." 
The  two  unions stated that they had decided to set up  a 
Standing Committee  for agreement  between them  "to pool all their 
resources  to promote  progress  towards  unity in the  countries of 
Western Europe." 
3.  French industrialists and the  ten per cent reduction in 
intra-Community duties 
"La  Vie  Franctaise"  has published the  op1.n1.ons  of several 
professional organizations  on  the  ten per cent  reduction in cus-
toms duties between the  Six. 
The  car industry:  "We  are  'Europeans';  we  believe that it 
would have  been  anomalous  to defer the  duty cut;  several  manu-
f~cturers, furthermore,  cut their prices in anticipation of this 
- 22  -reduction so  that it will not have  any noticeable effect." 
Constructional  engineering:  "We  opposed  any accele·ration 
of·the customs  dismantlement but  we  do  support its being car-
ried out  according to the  schedule  laid down  in the Treaty of 
Rome." 
Electrical engineering:  "On  the  whole,  our industry ex-
ports more  than it imports  so that the  customs  duty reduction 
will be  in our favour.  One  reservation should,  however,  be 
made  with regard to  consumer  goods  for we  buy more  of these 
abroad than we  sell." 
Chemical  industry:  "Our 'competitors will have  easier ac-
cess to our market  but  we  shall have  easier access  to theirs." 
This  universal approval is, after all,  quite natural since, 
on  the  whole,  more  than  a  third of France's exports  go  to other 
Common  Market countries.  The  Treaty of  Rome  confers reciprocal 
advantages  on its members. 
In this connexion,  one  observation may  be  madea  French in-
dustrialists are  concerned about  a  reduction in customs  duties 
on products  from  the East European countries for they are afraid 
that concessions  made  by France might  not  be counterbalanced by 
equivalent benefits."  (La Vie  Frangaise,  31  December  1965) 
- 23  -III.  EXTERNAL  RELATIONS 
1.  Austriaq views  on East  European and EEC  policy 
Addressing the  press on 14 December 1965,  Mr.  Bruno 
Kreisky,  Austrian Foreign Minister,  described the notion enter-
tained in various  Western circles that the  Communist  States of 
Eastern and Southern Europe  could  be  "weaned of  Communism  by a 
kind of  economic  homeopathy"  as  "sheer illusion".  On  the  other 
hand,  there could be  observed in those States a  political proc-
ess of differentiation that was  more  rapid than generally as-
sumed.  This  offered entirely new  opportunities for the  foreign 
policy of  democratic States in Western Europe.  The  Austrian 
Foreign Minister,  who  had been invited to  speak to the  "Over-
seas  Club"  of Hamburg  on  "Austria  and current developments in 
the  Danube  area",  expressed the hope  that the  loosening-up 
process in East  European countries would continue  and  lead to 
"relatively independent States"  which would  no  longer be  mere 
appendages  of  a  powerful political State. 
Austria's task today was  to  help  to  establish in the 
Danube  area conditions  of stability that had not  existed for 
hundreds  of years,  without however resorting to  a  policy of 
appeasement.  In the light of the  relatively good  understanding 
that existed between Vienna  and  the capitals of Eastern Europe, 
~r. Kreisky was  concerned about  the  fact that complete  integra-
tion of  Europe  - which  would  embrace  both the  EEC  and  EFTA  -
had still not been achieved.  Should  such  a  bridge not  be built 
within the  next five years,  then a  competitive  struggle  "for the 
hungry market"  of Eastern Europe  would  be  inevitable.  In the 
process - and  this was  particularly regrettable - any  grounds 
for respect  and understanding towards  European institutions 
would  lose their force.  Mr.  Kreisky instanced the  current cri-
sis in the unification of Europe  which had already led to false 
assessments  in Eastern bloc States of  "capitalistic Europe". 
In a  special  "EEC"  issue  of the  "Volkswirt"  (supplement to 
No.  39  of  1  October 1965)  Dr.  Karl  Bobleter,  Secretary of State 
in the Austrian Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs,  asked in 
an article entitled  "A  bridge  to Eastern Europe"  whether admis-
sion of Austria to the  EEC  might  not perhaps  be  the first step 
towards  expansion of the  EEC  towards  the East.  Dr.  Bobleter 
recalled the decision taken by the  EEC  Council  of Ministers  to 
enter into negotiations with Austria under the  chairmanship  of 
the Foreign Minister of France  - a  signatory to the Austrian 
State Treaty and  at present  actively concerned wi.th  an Eastern 
bloc policy.  Dr.  Karl  Bobleter was  convinced that Austria,  in 
view of her long experience in the  Danube  area,  could play a 
valuable part in the  changing political relations between West-
ern and Eastern Europe.  This  did not  of course mean  that 
Austria was  prepared  "to accept  compromises  with the  ideals 
and outlook of a  Communist-atheist ideology." 
- 25  -Dr.  Bobleter devoted his attention mainly to the  markets 
of the Eastern bloc; whose  potential - particularly for the  ex-
panding economy  of the  EEC  - was  far greater than was  generally 
realized.  So  long as  relations with the Eastern bloc were  ham-
pered by barbed-wire fences  and minefields,  the policy towards 
the East would be  faced with difficult obstacles.  It w~s here 
that the Austrians  could,  and indeed must,  play a  major Euro-
pean rSle.  Austria's neutrality,  though it precluded full mem-
bership of the  EEC  and necessitated special arrangements  for 
her participation,  was  a  suitable soil for  a  successful Eastern 
policy.  This  was  why  in all negotiations with the EEC  to date, 
Austria had claimed the right  to  maintain,  and even extend, 
trade  relations with the  Danube  States and all Eastern coun-
tries.  By  suitable means,  Austria would strive to  avoid any 
short-term disadvantages  to  the  EEC  presented by relations with 
the East.  Dr.  Bobleter was  convinced that an agreement with the 
EEC  would not obstruct the  exPansion of trade between Austria 
and the States of Eastern Europe.  "When  we  speak of European 
unification,  we  must  not  lose sight of the  fact that Europe 
ends not at the  Elbe,  the  Bohemian Forest  and  the river Drava. 
We  must  realize that behind the  Iron Curtain there are Europe-
ans  who  desire,  and are entitled,  one  day to take part in the 
unification of our Continent." 
The  special issue of the  "Volkswirt"  entitled "Trotz Kri-
sen - Magnetfeld EWG"  (in spite of crises,  the  EEC  continues to 
act as  a  magnet)  also contains the  following articles:.  Dr. 
Walter Hallstein: ,  "Die  Anziehungskraft der EWG"  (The  pull ex-
erted by the  EEC),  Dr.  Andreas  Pred~hl: '"Das  europ~ische 
Kraftfeld in der Weltwirtschaft"  (The  European field of force 
in world trade),  Mr.  Knut  Hammerskj~ld:  "Die  EFTA  als Instru-
ment  gesamteurop~ischer Integration"  (EFTA  as  an instrument  of 
overall European integration),  Dr.  Karl Schiller:  "Wege  zur. 
wirtschaftlichen Einheit Europas"  (Ways  of achieving economic 
unity in Europe).  (Die  Welt,  15  December 1965;  Neue  ZUrcher 
Zeitung,  16  December  1965;  Der Volkswirt,  supplement to  No.  39, 
1  October 1965) 
2.  Great Britain and the  EEC 
At  Q~estion Time  in the  House  of  Commons  on 6  December, 
Mr.  Stewart,  British Foreign Secretary,  stated: 
"Her Majesty's  Government's policy remains  that we  are 
ready and willing to  join the  European  Community provided that 
essential British interests are safeguarded  •••  The  Government 
have also  on several occasions made  it known  that they would 
like to see a  wider European unity.  It follows,  I  think,  from 
those  two  things that such  a  wider European unity would partake 
more  of the nature of EEC  than of EFTA.  But  one  of the British 
interests to be  safeguarded is our  good reputation with the 
EFTA  partners,  and  any approach to  EEC  would have  to  be  in con-
sultation with them." 
- 26  -Asked  whether this meant  that the  Government still insist-
ed  on  the five  conditions originally laid down  by the Labour 
Party,  Mr.  Stewart replied: 
"•••  These five  conditions still remain  and  to  my  mind 
they are essential.  I  think that it is true that the actual 
passage of events  makes  some  of these conditions easier to ful-
fil now  than at the  time  when  they were  formulated." 
In answer to  a  question as  to whether this view was  con-
sistent with  "bridge building" between EFTA  and  the  EEC,  Mr. 
Stewart further stated: 
"I never use  the phrase  "bridge building"  myself because 
I  think that these metaphors  are  misleading.  There  is nothing 
inconsistent between readiness  to  join EEC,  provided that es-
sential British interests are  safeguarded,  and  the pursuit of 
practical projects  on which  we  and  other countries in Europe 
can work  together.  It is that which is commonly  described  as 
iibridge building",  though  I  think it is a  misleading name.  Some 
of the contacts which  we  have  been  able  to  make  with Europe  are 
both useful in themselves  and will make  the  atmosphere  more 
favourable  for a  wider European unity."  (Weekly Hansard 
No.  675,  House  of Commons,  6  December  1965) 
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PARLIAMENTARY  ACTIVITY 
- 29  -I. EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT 
a.  Activities of the  Committees  in December  1965 
Political Committee  (1) 
Meeting of 16  December in Brussels:  Discussion- in the 
presence  of representatives  of the  EEC  Commission,  Euratom Com-
mission  and  High Authority of the  ECSC  - of the political situ-
ation of the  Community  and  of  arrangements  for the  "annual col-
loq"uy"  - scheduled for the  January session 1966 - between the 
Parliament,  the  Councils  and  the  Executives. 
Agricultural  Committee  (3) 
Meeting of 16  December in Paris:  Examination  and  adoption 
of a  draft Opinion by Mr.  Klinker,  to  be  referred to  the  Inter-
nal Market  Committee,  on  a  proposal  by the  Commission  of  the 
European Economic  Community  to  the  Council  on  a  second direc-
tive  on the  approximation of  the  laws  of Member  States  on  turn-
over taxes,  concerning the  structure  and  machinery for applying 
the  common  system of added value  taxation. 
Social  Committee  (4) 
Meeting of 14  December in Brussels:  Statement by Mr.  Petre 
on  the  progress  of  the  Committee's  work  on  reconversion.  The 
study  o~ a  report by Mr.  Troclet  on  the. draft recommendation 
concern1ng the protection of young  workers  was  continued  and 
the  report  adopted. 
Meeting of 21  December  in Brussels:  Examination of the 
working paper drafted by Mr.  Carcaterra on  a  Commission note  on 
the  action taken by the  Member  States in compliance  with the 
recommendation concerning the  activity of social welfare  de-
partments  in regard to workers  changing their residence within 
the  Community.  Examination,  on  the  basis  of a  note drafted by 
Mr.  Sabatini,  Rapporteur,  of the  draft  EEC  Commission  recommen-
dation designed to  promote  occupational  training.  Examination 
of  a  draft regulation amending  and  supplementing regulations  3 
and  4  concerning social security for migrant  workers. 
- 31  -Internal Market  Committee  (5) 
Meeting af 13  and 14 December  in Rome:  Examination,  at a 
meeting atten ed by  representative~ of  the  FF~ Commission,  of 
the draft report by Mr.  Berkhouwer  on adz  ___  directive to co-
ordinate guarantees  required in Member  States of firms  or com-
panies  as  defined in Article 58,2 of the  Treaty to protect the 
interests both of  associates and third parties.  Examination, 
at  a  meeting attended by representatives of  the  EEC  Commission, 
of the draft report by Mr.  Wohlfart  on  (a)  a  directive con-
cerning the  freedom  of  establishment  and  the free  supply of 
services in non-wage-earning activities in the  food  and  drink 
production industries  (classes 20  and  21  I.C.T.I.),  (b)  a 
directive  on the transitional 'machinery affecting the  same. 
Vote  on the  draft report.  Resumed  study,  at  a  meeting  attended 
by representatives  of the  EEC  Commission,  of  a  draft report by 
Mr.  Seuffert on  the draft relating to  a  second directive  on  the 
matter of approximating the  laws  of the  Member  States  on  turn-
over taxes with special reference  to the structure  and  imple-
menting machinery of the  common  added value  taxation system. 
Committee  for Co-operation with Developing Countries  (7) 
Meeting  of  17  December  in Paris:  Brief discussion of  the, 
results of  the  last meeting  of the  Parliamentary Conference  of 
the  Association  (Rome,  6-9 December 1965);  appointment  of Mr. 
Metzger as  Rapporteur.  Discussion,  in the  presence  of  the  EEC 
Commission,  of  the  state of relations between the  EEC  and  non-
associated developing countries. 
Transport  Committee  (8) 
Meet~ng of 16  December in Brussels:  Exchange  of views,  at 
a  meeting  attended by Mr.  Schaus,  Member  of the  EEC  Commission, 
on  the  draft report by Mr.  de  Gryse  on the  system approved by 
the  Council  on  22  June  1965 for regulating the  transport  market 
and  on  the  modifications  made  by the  EEC  Commission to its pro-
posals  of  10  May  1963  concerning the  introduction of  a  tariff 
bracket  system. 
- 32  -Committee  for Research and Cultural Affairs  (10) 
Meeting of  2  December in Brussels:  Exchange  of views  on 
the draft resolution submitted by Mrs.  Strobel  on  creating a 
European  Youth  Organization.  Examination of the draft report 
by Mr.  Merten  on the creation of  European schools  where  the 
training given would  be  up  to pre-university level.  This  meet-
ing was  attended by Mr.  Sardo  and  Mr.  Voss,  head-masters  of the 
European Schools  at Brussels  and  Luxembourg respectively,  and 
by representatives  of  the three  Communities  on  the  European 
Schools  Board.  Exchange  of views  on  a  draft resolution,  sub-
mitted by Mr.  Bernasconi,  on instituting a  European sports 
qualification. 
Health Protection Committee  (11) 
Meeting of 3  December in Brussels:  Examination  and  adop-
tion at a  meeting attended by EEC  Commission representatives of 
a  draft report by Mr.  de  Bosio  on  a  draft  EEC  Commission recom-
mendation to  the  Member  States on  the possibilities of  indemni-
fication in the  case  of  occupational diseases. 
b.  Parliamentary Conference  of the  Association with the 
African and  Malagasy States 
Second  meeting of the  Conference  (Rome,  6-9  December  1965) 
The  second meeting of the Parliamentary Conference  of the 
Association set up  by the  Yaounde  Convention,  signed in July 
1963,  was  held in Rome  from 6-9 December  1965. 
In addition to  the  Council of Association,  the  Committee 
of Association and  the  Arbitration Court  of  the  Association, 
the Parliamentary Conference  is  one  of  the  institutions of the 
Association; it is important  in two  ways:  on  the  one  hand,it 
enables  the peoples  concerned to take  a  more  direct part in im-
plementing the  Association and,  on  the  other, it each year ex-
amines  an activity report drafted by the  Council  of Associa-
tion.  The  Conference consists of  54  members  of  the  European 
Parliament  and  54 members  of  the Parliaments  of  the  African and 
Malagasy States (i.e.  three delegates for each associated  Stat~. 
- 33  -The  constituent session of the  annual  meeting was  Gpened 
by Mr.  Lamine  Gueye,  the  retiring President;  in welcoming the 
delegates  he  stressed the  importance  of the  peoples'  being rep-
resented in the  Association.  The  new  Bureau was  then elected 
by acclamation.  Mr.  Victor Leemans,  Belgian Senator and Presi-
dent of the  European Parliament was  elected as  the  new  Presi-
dent  and  Mr.  Lamine  Gueye  was  elected first Vice-President.  At 
this formal  session Mr.  Leemans,  Mr.  Lamine  Gueye,  Mr.  Colombo 
(President-in-office  of  the  EEC  Council  of Ministers),  Mr.  Hel 
Bongo  (representing the  Chad  Government  and President of  the 
Council  of Association)  and  Mr.  Rochereau  (Member  of the  EEC 
Commission)  all took the  floor. 
The  subsequent  sessions  revolved round  the  discussion of 
various  reports  submitted to  the  Conference.  These  reports had 
been drafued by the  Joint  Committee  which is,  as it were,  re-
sponsible for continuity between meetings  of the  Conference. 
Mrs.  Strobel began by submitting a  report  on the  rules  of pro-
cedure  of  the  Conference;  a  resolution appended to  the  report 
was  passed,  thus  giving the  Conference  a  final set of rules  of 
procedure.  Mr.  Guillabert submitted the  report  on  the  finan-
cial arrangements  for  the  Conference  and  Mr.  N'Gom  presented 
the  management  accounts  for 1964  and  the  draft budget for 1965. 
A report  on the Council  of Association's first annual  ac-
tivity report  covering the  period from  1  June  1964 to  31  May 
1965 was  drawn  up  by Mr.  Pedini.  In his report he  stressed 
that the  Association was,  in its own  sphere,  an  answer to  some 
of the  great problems  the world was  trying to  solve,  such  as 
peace,  security,  regulating world markets  and sharing the 
wealth of nations fairly.  He  made  the  point that trade  had in-
creased since  the  Yaounde  Convention came  into  force  and that 
the  obligations  stemming  from it had been fulfilled with regard 
to liberalizing markets.  There  were  still certain difficulties 
due  to  the  delay in the EEC's  classifying products  originating 
from  the  Associated States.  As  for the  European  Development 
Fund,  Mr.  Pedini  emphasized how  necessary it was  to  achieve  max-
imum  co-ordination between financial  and technical assistance. 
The  Association had to  dovetail its work with that  of other in-
ternational institutions working to  combat  under-development. 
~ 
During the  debate  Mr.  Rochereau,  speaking for the  EEC  Com-
mission,  went  some  way  to meeting the concern expressed by the 
Rapporteur.  He  emphasized the  promising trends in evidence in 
Africa,  especially with the  "Union Douaniere  et Economique 
d'Afrique  Centrale"  then in session and.whose  aim was  to  organ-
ize  a  full-scale  economic  union.  As  regards  financing agree-
ments,  the  Association's  work was  continuing:  since  26  November 
1964,  93  schemes  had been approved at a  cost of 193 million 
units  of account.  The  European Development  Fund provided a  fo-
cal point for discussions  between Associates  and Member  States 
and it had  two  distinct ends  in view: 
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ly experimental basis in three  associated States, 
b)  market  promotion - surveys  had  been initiated to  gather 
more  information about marketing problems  concerning 
bananas,  fats,  leather and hides;  also  the  subject of 
special studies were  agricultural problems,  product 
packaging,  product processing and  marketing.  The  EEC 
Commission was  still convinced that  the  work being done 
at  the  economic  level under the  Convention had to  be 
dovetailed with that of other international organiza-
tions,  such  as  GATT  and  the  "Union  Douaniere  et Econo-
mique  d'Afrique  Centrale".  The  Yaounde  Convention 
served as  an  example  but  was  not  a  solution in itself. 
Mr.  Del  Bo,  President  of the  ECSC  High Authority,  laid 
stress  on  the  need  to  reorientate  the  economies  of  the  indus-
trialized States:  it had  been found  in fact  that very often 
the  per capita incomes  of  people  in industrialized States were 
increasing,  whereas.the  incomes  of people  in developing coun-
tries did not  enable  them  even to  satisfy their most  pressing 
needs. 
Various  speakers  then  took the  floor in the  discussion to 
speak of the  concerns  of their own  particular countries  of ori-
gin:  Mr.  Nyamoya  (Burundi),  Mr.  Ratsima  (Malagasy Republic), 
Mr.  Hagi  Bachir Ismail  (Somalia)  and  Mr.  Sissoko  (Mali). 
Several  members  of the  EuFopean  Delegation intervened to 
stress how  important  the  aims  of the  Association were  and  how 
necessary it was  to  look ahead beyond  1967. 
Ivir.  Rochereau  and  Mr.  Hel  Bongo  replied to  the  various 
speakers  who  had  made  criticisms or expressed approval. 
~he draft resolution put forward  by Mr.  Pedini  was  then 
passed unanimously. 
Mr.  Margulies,  a  member  of the  Euratom Commission,  drew 
the attention of the  Conference  to  the possibilities of  making 
use  of nuclear science in the  Associated States.  He  quoted 
four projects,  the  study of which was  nearing completion  and 
which concerned respectively the  action against the tetse fly, 
freeing cattle  from parasitic larvae,  freezing or canning sea-
fish  and  improving the  millet yield. 
At  the  close of the proceedings  the  Conference  elected the 
Bureau of the  Joint  Committee  :  Mr.  Georges  Damas,  President  of 
the National  Assembly of  Gabon,  was  elected President  and  Mr. 
Gaston Thorn,  Vice-President.  Mr.  Alioune  Sissoko was  later to 
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During the  session tlte  Conference  delegates were  invited 
to  a  reception given by Mr.  Saragat,  President  of  the Italian 
Republic.  Pope  Paul VI,  furthermore,  gave  an audience  to  the 
Conference,  thus  underlining that the  Association was  a  peace-
ful venture  whose  representational  and democratic  character 
were  expressed in the Parliamentary Conference.  In his  homily, 
the  Pope  returned to  the  themes  of his  speech at the United Na-
tions,  laying stress  on the  efforts that had  to be  made  to pre-
serve  world peace. 
- 36  -II.  NATIONAL  PARLIAMENTS 
a.  Germany 
the  debate  in the  Bun-
2  November  to  2  De-
Dr.  Rainer Barzel,  Chairman  of  the  CDU/CSU  Group  in the 
Bundestag,  observed at the start of  the  debate  how  much  easier 
it would  be  if NATO  States decided to co-ordinate their foreign 
policies.  This particularly applied to negotiations  on the  con-
trol of  armaments  and  to  the  Alliance's policy in times  of 
acute crisis.  Dr.  Barzel  appealed to his  audience  to  make  of 
NATO  something  more  than  a  mere  military alliance.  As  the  peo-
ples of the  Atlantic  Community were  all faced with the  same,  or 
similar,  social  and political problems,  the  Atlantic  Defence 
Community  should be  increasingly transformed,  by a  combined ef-
fort,  into  a  great Society (this in allusion to the  US  Presi-
dent's  speech in September 1965). 
Germany  was  bound  to  France  above  all  by  the  inseparable 
destinies  of the  two  countries;  there  could be  no  place,  there-
fore,  for either resignation or misguided love.  But  Frenchmen 
and  Germans  depended  on  a  Europe  dedicated to peace;  and  since 
differences had arisen between them in different spheres,  they 
must  step  up  talks with each other.  France  too  should give  a 
sign of re-entering the  partnership,  as  she  too needed Europe. 
Germany  sought  friendship not  only with France,  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain,  but  also  with all other States. 
After dealing in detail with the  problems  of reunification 
and  of  Central  and Eastern Europe,  Dr.  Barzel  turned to  the 
unification of Europe.  Europe  - he  stated - should not  be  re-
garded as  a  "third force"  but  as  a  partner of her Atlantic 
friends  and  of all States who  prized freedom.  Lack of unity 
.was  impairing Europe's  standing in the  eyes  of the  worlds  "We 
want  to unite  Europe  on the  lines already embarked  on.  Our 
energies  should be  devoted to purposeful progress rather than 
to  the  discussion of  ever new-methods  and  projects.  In Europe 
as  a  whole  there can be  differences in the  degree  of integra-
tion,  in areas  of co-operation and  in the  formulas  adopted for 
co-operation;  the  number  of States belonging to  European  organ-
izations may  also vary widely from  case  to  case.  In short,  we 
must  concentrate  on  the creation of further - if possible per-
manent  - Community factors,  rather than insist that all regula-
tions should .fit neatly into  a  system." 
Dr.  Barzel  expressed the  CDU/CSU  Group's  regret at the  EEC 
crisis  and his disappointment  at the  demands  made  on farmers 
and  taxpayers  by the policy followed  on cereal prices.  He 
called upon  the  Federal Government  to see  to it that both the 
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shared.  "Progress  in Europe  depends  on  a  spirit of  give  and 
take  and  joint discussion,  not  on issuing and  obeying orders." 
The  EEC  Treaty itself offered all the facilities needed to 
overcome  the  EEC  crisis.  Treaty provisions must  be  faithfully 
complied with,  and Dr.  Barzel welcomed  the proposal  made  by the 
Community to France  in October 1965.  His  Group  was  in favour 
of large-scale talks between the  Six for the  purpose  of study-
ing the  European situation and working out  new  common  ap-
proaches  for the future.  He  was  convinced that  a  connexion 
existed between the  EEC  crisis,  Europe's progress  and  the  pro-
posed  NATO  reforms,  and wound  up  his  address with the words: 
"It is high time  to press  on with the unification of Europe. 
Our political will remains  unbroken." 
Mr.  Erler,  spokesman  of  the  SPD  Group,  did not think that 
the  EEC  could be  delivered from  the crisis by any magic  for-
mula.  But  anyone  who  set store  on preserving what  had already 
been  achieved - of  a  further step  forward  he  would  not venture 
to  speak - should above  all take  no  hand  in the  undermining of 
Community institutions.  He  welcomed  the  Five's invitation to 
France  and  the  Governments'  attempt  to discuss  - in the  ab-
sence  of  the  Commission - a  way  out  of the  present deadloek. 
The  Governments  should not· however contravene  the  provisions  of 
the  Treaty by allowing themselves  to  be  drawn  into  a  discussion 
1  of  the  internal affairs  of  the  Communities,  and the talks  of 
the  Ministers  should not  be  used as  a  means  of revising Commu-
nity decisions.  The  Community could  only be  saved if the  Five 
held fast to the  Rome  Treaties.  Anyone  who  acted against  them 
would  carry the  responsibility.  Undermining the  Treaties would 
merely  mean  wrecking  a  great undertaking and  the hopes  of  the 
peoples  of Europe.  German  interests were  better served by the 
Community  than by  a  national  "go it alone"  policy which carried 
the  seeds  of total isolation.  The  task ahead lay in strength-
ening  and  democratizing the  Communities,  augmenting their pow-
ers  and  membership,  and  establishing their partnership with the 
USA,. 
In spite  of the difficulties through which  the  EEC  was 
passing,  any attempt  to bring about  effective collaboration 
between  EFTA  and  the  Common  Market  should be  welcomed,  as  the 
existing Fift in free  Europe  could not  be  allowed to  widen.  In 
Mr.  Erler's view,  the  difficulties  encountered by European pol-
icy pointed anew  to  the  interdependence  of political and 'eco-
nomic  questions.  A muddled  approach to  foreign policy also had 
serious  consequences  for  the  economy.  Economies  throughout  the 
world were  now  so  closely interwoven that  only a  sound foreign 
policy could ensure  that climate  of confidence  so  necessary for 
a  healthy capital market  and  a  high level of  investment. 
The  current crisis should not  be  allowed to  mar  the  rec-
onciliation between  Germany  and  France  as this was  the  mainstay 
of the  European  Community.  Social  Democrats  in both countries 
had  a  great tradition for reconciliation,  always  aiming at col-
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ty,  and not  at the  submission of  one  to  the will of the polit-
ical rulers  of  the  other.  It was  in this spirit that the  Bun-
destag had  conceived the  preamble  to  the  Franco-German Treaty 
which  anchors  the  Treaty in the  European  Community  and in 
Atlantic solidarity. 
Dr.  Franz-Josef Strauss,  CSU  leader,  placed the  emphasis 
on nuclear questions  in the part of his  speech devoted to for-
eign policy.  He  pleaded that the  opportunities for the crea-
tion of an  independent  European nuclear force  should not  be 
obstructed.  He  warned  against ill-considered approval  of  a 
multilateral or Atlantic nuclear force  and  opposed participa-
tion in such  a  strike force  - with,  perhaps,  Gemany's  signa-
ture  to  a  non-proliferation agreement  - because  this might 
make  it difficult to build a  European nuclear force.  He  call-
ed  upon  the  Federal  Government  not  to enter into  any such ar-
rangement  except  after the  most  thorough investigation,  and not 
to  allow itself to be  put  under pressure.  Although  the princi-
ple of equality prevailed in NATO,  differences  arose  because 
of location,  duties,  etc.,  so  that  some  partners were  "more 
equal  than others".  Dr.  Strauss called for  rea~ equality of 
rights with  the  other European  NATO  partners.  This  could not 
however be  achieved by allowing  Germany  nuclear  arms,  but  on-
ly "if,  conscious  of  the  goal,  we  adopt  the correct approach, 
i.e. strive for  a  European solution,  namely that the  second 
great power  of the  West  and  not  the  third force  which  was  in a 
position to shift the political force  relationship in the  world 
in Europe  as well  as  in the East,  should claim the  same  meas-
ure  of sovereignty for itself over  a  long  term and  be  in a 
position to defend itself in the  same  way  as  the  United States 
of America." 
Dr.  Strauss again pointed out  that  once  Europe  (if possi-
ble including the  United Kingdom)  was  politically united ·and 
a  European deterrent was  in existence,  the  USA  could withdraw 
a  substantial part of its strike force  from  Europe.  After all, 
one  could not  expect  the  USA  to bear the  sole responsibility 
because of the  deficient participation of  the  other partners. 
Washington needed  Europe  not  as  bridgehead or as  a  nuclear pro-
tectorate but  as  a  kind  of  second  major western power. 
Mr.  Helmut  Schmidt  (Hamburg,  SPD),  referring to  the  views 
of  Dr.  Strauss regarding a  European  defence  community with its 
own  nuclear potential,  pointed out that this presupposed the 
political union of  Europe; it was  not  at the  moment  feasible, 
however,  because neither in Britain nor in France  did the  nec-
essary conditions exist.  With  regard to the  Federal Republic's 
joint responsibility in nuclear matters  and  to  questions  of nu-
clear strategy and  organization,  Mr.  Schmidt  observed that the 
issue was  not  one  of  "right or wrong or of prestige or inferi-
ority complexes;  the  problems  are  exclusively of  a  military 
nature  and,  to  a  lesser degree,  of political expedience.  The 
question is not  one  of rights.  We  have  no  right to  the  bomb 
- 39  -and the  question of right or wrong simply does  not arise.  11 
Mr.  Schmidt  then expressed his views  on  the  Federal Re-
public's  joint responsibility in the  nuclear sector.  This,  in 
his opinion,  could be  discharged without the  possession of nu-
clear arms  and without  entering into new  agreements.  He  ap-
pealed above  all for  German participation in contingency plan-
ning  and  in all allied measures  for  the  overcoming of crises 
that also  affected German  interestsJ  In addition he  was  in 
favour  of  a  right of veto particularly in respect of nuclear 
arms  to  be  used  from or on  German  soil.  On  being asked by Dr. 
Strauss how  he  thought  such  a  veto  could  be  applied,  Mr.Schmidt 
recommended  that the previous  Anglo-American talks  on  Thor  rock-
ets - at the  time  stationed in England  - and  the  two-key system, 
should be  taken as  a  model.  (Bundestag,  5th election period, 
7th session,  Bonn,  29  November'l965;  Bundestag,  5th election 
period,  8th session,  Bonn,  30  November  1965) 
b.  Netherlands 
1.  General political discussions in the First Chamber  on the 
Budget  for 1966 
During the  debate,  held in the  First Chamber  of the 
States-General  (30  November  to  1  December  1965)  on  the  Budget 
for 1966,  Mr.  Gals,  the  Prime  Minister,  referred the  renewed 
appeal  addressed to  France  by the  EEC  Council  (30  November)  to 
resume  her seat  on the  Council. 
Mr.  Gals  said that the  Five  were  opposed to  any  amendment 
of the  Treaty likely to  impair the  status of the  European  Com-
mission or prejudice  the  majority-voting principle.  It was  well 
known  that with respect  to widening  the powers  of  the  European 
Parliament  there were  differing shades  of opinion on the  Coun-
cil.  It might perhaps  be  possible  to  defer the  implementation 
of the  majority-voting principle;  but  the  real issue  was  rather 
whether,  ~der the  present  circumstances,  the  crisis could be 
solved in this way. 
Majority-vote decisions were  of vital importance  from  the 
point of view of  the  status of  the  European  Commission.  The 
institutional structure of  the  Community  formed  an indivisible 
whole  and  any restriction affecting one  institution would rap-
idly affect the  status of the  others.  (Proceedings in the 
First Chamber,  30  November  and  1  December  1965) 
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responsible for the  Foreign Affairs budget 
During the  budget  debate in the  Second  Chamber  of the 
Dutch States-General  on  2  December,  the  Committee  responsible 
for the Foreign Affairs  budget dealt at length with European 
integration.  Several written questions published in the  pre-
vious  edition of this Bulletin served to  clear the  ground for 
the debate. 
a)  The  ~risis in the  European  Communities 
Reviewing the  events that had taken place since  the  EEC 
Council  session of  28  October,  Mr.  Luns,  Dutch  Foreign Minister, 
recalled France's  reaction to  the written invitation of  the 
Council  to take part in a  meeting of  the Council  in Brussels; 
this was  to  be  an  extraordinary meetin~ at which  the  EEC  Com-
mission would  not be  represented,  held to discuss  the political 
issues raised by France  in connexion with the crisis of  30  June 
1965. 
It was  Mr.  Couve  de  Murville,  French Foreign Minister,  who 
communicated  the  French reaction to  the  Ambassadors  from  the 
five  countries;  the latter gained  the  impression that France 
would  regard as  untimely any meeting in Brussels  in the  Treaty 
setting.  Mr.  Couve  de  Murville  then indicated that the French 
Government  would  be  ready to  take  part in a  meeting  of  the  Six 
Foreign Ministers provided it were  not  held either in Brussels 
or within the  Treaty framework,  to discuss political problems. 
Hence  agricultural policy and  the financial  regulation,  which 
had been  the  actual  cause  of  the crisis, would  give  way  to  a 
concern with purely political problems.  The  French  Government, 
furthermore,  felt that such  a  meeting should not  take place un-
til the  Quai  d'Orsay was  sure,  after bilateral consultations 
with the  various countries,  that the  meeting  would  be  a  success. 
It was  against this background  that talks  were  held be-
tween the  French Foreign Minister and  Dr.  Schroder,  German  For-
eign Minister,  within the  framework  of  the  Franco-German Trea-
ty.  The  same  was  true of talks with Mr.  Luns,  Dutch  Foreign 
Minister,  who,furthermore,  simply listened,  feeling that nego-
tiations with the  French  Government  could not  be  entered into 
until the  Five  had held reciprocal consultations  on the  reply 
to  be  addressed to  France. 
At  the  Council  session of 29  and  30  November,  the Five 
felt it would  be  appropriate  to  set  on record their reaction 
to France's oral reply and  they took advantage  of  the  opportu-
nity to state that they would  stand by the spirit and the  let-. 
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Referring to  the political outcome  of the  EEC  Council 
meeting,  Mr.  Luns  stated that  "the  concensus  between the  Five 
was  even more  noticeable at the  meeting  and it appeared that 
the  aims  and views  of the  Five  followed  on similar lines."  The 
five  Governments  would  not  assent to  the  Treaties  of  Brussels 
being impaired in any way  and  they felt that the  majority vote 
principle had to be  upheld. 
Mr.  Westerterp  (Catholic People's Party)  saw  the roots  of 
the crisis not  only in President  de  Gaulle's opposition to  a 
greater measure  of integration in the  EEC,  but  also in his fur-
ther attempt  to  attain to  a  better bargaining position for 
achieving a  European political union which would  be  intergov-
ernmental  in structure and which  would  have  a  clearly defined 
end  in view:  the  prosecution of what  he  regarded as  "a European 
policy for  a  European Europe." 
If this were  the  case  he  had of course  to  think in terms 
of  the  strategy and tactics that would  lead to  the political 
end,  so  that minor  concessions  about  the  Treaty would not  even 
enter his head.  The  speaker felt that  some  of  the  French ideas 
might  perhaps  be  examined,  provided that the  structure of  the 
political union,  as  envisaged by General  de  Gaulle,  did not 
simply make  it impossible to achieve this objective.  It was 
the  combination of this intergovernmental  and political union 
and  its political implications that  made  it a  threat both to 
the  Netherlands  and  to  Europe  itself. 
Mr.  Patijn (Labour Party) felt that the  roots  of  the cri-
sis lay in the  military sphere  and  in France's attitude to  the 
United States.  Yet  the  rift between  France  and  the  other coun-
tries had  opened  up  in the  Community setting;  to  be  more  spe-
cific, with reference  to  the  status of the  European  Commission, 
the powers  of the  European Parliament  and  Council decisions' 
being taken by a  qualified majority.  Mr.  Patijn felt that 
making  economic  concessions,  which  to  some  extent  simplified 
the  situation,  was  no  way  to settle a  political dispute.  Under 
present  circumstances,  the  negotiating margin was  slim.  Verbal 
protests  ~mounted in fact  to  very little and for this reason 
the  Five  ought  to  think very seriously about  "going it alone" 
even at the  risk of running  into  opposition from  France  which 
was  still officially a  member  of the  Community. 
Mr.  Vredeling  (Labour Party)  pointed out  that the  Five had 
still not  made  up  their minds  whether the  Council  could validly 
take decisions  in the  absence  of the  sixth partner.  He  warned 
against the  danger of  the  Community's  standpoint being under-
mined.  In its August  memorandum  the  EEC  Commission had really 
given the  impression that it had forgotten the  European Parlia-
ment.  Then,  when  the  Council  met  on 26  October,  it too  made  a 
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and the  five  Governments  gave  the  impression that they shared 
this attitude.  Despite their declaration that the  Six could 
only meet  once  in extraordinary session without  the  Commission 
attending,  it did not  seem to have  occurred to  the  Five  that by 
agreeing to  meet  a  second  time  without  the  Commission,  there 
was  anything unusual  about continuing its work without  the  Ex-
ecutive.  With reference  to  the  French issue,  Mr.  Lardinois 
(Catholic People's Party)  pointed out  that  the  French absence 
from the  Council  had precluded any decision on  the  Commission 
proposals.  He  asked the  Foreign Minister whether it was  still 
possible  to  accept  the  regulations of the  Six and at the  same 
time  the  EEC  Commission proposals  on highly controversial is-
sues,  when  in fact  only Five  were  engaged in the business  of 
the Six.  How  long could work be  continued under these condi-
tions,  he  asked;  until February 1966  or February 1967? 
Mr.  Luns  replied that the Five  could continue to  implement 
the  Treaties  of  Rome  and Paris for  some  time,  as  long as  France 
accepted the written procedure  and participated in this way in 
the taking of certain decisions.  But  as  soon as  the  moulding 
of Community policy ceased and  the  building of the  Communities 
was  arrested,  it was  to  be  feared that disintegration would  set 
in.  The  Dutch  Government  felt,  and  there  was  good  reason to  be-
lieve that this was  also  the  opinion of the  other four partners, 
that if France persisted in refusing to attend meetings  of  the 
Council,  the Five  would  be  induced to  go  forward  on their own. 
In the  long run it would not,  however,  be  possible  to apply the 
rule  of Six,  so  that several of  the  institutional provisions 
would have  to be  modified.  This  did not  mean  that  the  Five 
could not  take  any decisions until the  Treaty had been revised; 
they certainly had  the  power  to  do  so  in view of  the  imperative 
character of Article 146.  A Community  of Five  would, however, 
necessitate certain amendments  to  the  Treaty. 
The  disintegration of the  Community  standpoint  that Mr. 
Vredeling feared,was  not,  in Mr.  Luns's opinion,  the  result of 
any hostile intention.  He  had intended to  say:  "on the  Coun-
cil."  When  he  realized the  implications  of this term,  he  had 
insisted on the  simpler phrasing:  "the  Council".  The  Dutch 
Government,  furthermore  was  opposed to  any interpretative con-
vention  and  the  other four fully agreed here.  Although  there 
was  still no  Community  opinion on  the possibility of  a  ~ommon 
Market  of  the Five,  i.e. without France,  this problem had al-
ready been discussed between the  Five  and  the  outcome  of  these 
talks had been viewed with satisfaction by the  Dutch  Govern-
ment.  When  the  Council  discussed the  Commission  memorandum, 
the  Dutch  Government  reserved its position concerning the  of-
fice  of  tbe  European Parliament.  For France  simply to  accept 
the  financing of the  common  agricultural policy would not  be  a 
sufficient concession. 
As  to whether the  Governments  will or are  bound  to  clash, 
Mr.  Luns  replied:  "Of  course  I  am  not  sure,  but  I  think so.  I 
- 43  -think that the  Five will only reach this stage at the very end. 
The  unknown  factors  are  mainly legal  and  economic." 
The  Dutch  Government  would study what  happened if France 
were  absent  from  the  Kennedy  Round  discussions.  A plan to 
refer the  problem arising from the  present situation to  the 
Court  of Justice was  being studied at the  moment. 
In reply to  a  question from  Mr.  Lardinois,  Mr.  Luns  fur-
ther explained that it would not  be  possible to  continue  as  at 
present for very long  - at most  a  few  months.  He  felt,  how-
ever,  that  a  solution was  still possible.  Much,  if not  every-
thing depended  on the  line the  French  Government  took. 
Mr.  De  Block,  Secretary of State,  regarded the  Commis-
sion's reluctance to propose  "open prices" for agricultural 
products  as  symptomatic  of the difficulties;  for the  Commis-
sion had promised to  do  this at the  Council  meeting  of  25  and 
26  October.  This  showed  how  far the normal  activity of the 
Commission was  being hampered.  France's  absence,  furthermore, 
was  a  complication,  not  to  say a  complete  break with regard to 
the  work in hand,  especially that  concerning the  monetary  and 
the  short-term economic  policies. 
b)  Merger  of  the  Executives 
At  the  request  of  Mr.  Berkhouwer  (People's Party for Free-
dom  and  Democracy)  the discussion of this subject was  referred 
forward  to  a  special meeting  of  the  Committee. 
c)  Powers  of the  European Parliament  and  the  resolutions 
passed  on  24  September  and  20  October 1965 
In view  of  the  deferment until 1970 of  the  debates  on in-
dependent  revenues  for the  Community  and  hence  on  the  budgetary 
powers  of  the  European Parliament,  Mr.  Vredeling  (Labour Party) 
felt  that~the main focus  of attention should be  the  legislative 
powers  of the  European Parliament.  Mr.  De  Block,  Secretary of 
State,  considered that this might  well  be  of  even  greater mo-
ment  than the  normal  budgetary powers.  This  issue  was  highly 
relevant because  the  common  industrial market  was  due  to be 
completed  on 1  July 1967  when the  Council  of Ministers would  be 
able  to  take decisions  by a  qualified majority;  the  decisions, 
incidentally,  would  have  far-reaching financial,  economic  and 
social implications.  The  national parliaments would,  to  some 
extent,  be  powerless  because  they could no  longer compel  their 
governments  to  annul  any decision thus  taken.  This  was  a  mat-
ter of  deliberate intention and it was  well  known  as  soon as 
the  Treaty was  signed, ·but it was  a  pattern that could not  con-
ceivably be  established without  some  of  the powers  withdrawn 
-44-from  the national parliaments being transferred to the  European 
Parliament.  As  Mr.  Cals,  Prime  Minister,  said in reply to  the 
authors of written questions, it was  not possible  to  make  a  ma-
jority rule principle subject to  such  a  cession of  powers;  at 
the  same  time  the  lack of any regulations  as  to how  Community 
decisions  were  to  be  controlled,  forced the States to be very 
circumspect  about  delegating national powers  to the  EEC.bodies. 
It was  for these  reasons  that Mr.  Vredeling came  out  against 
any accelerated implementation of the  Common  Market  as  of 1  Ju-
ly 1967. 
Mr.  Blaisse  (Catholic People's Party)  pointed out  that as 
long as  the  Community had  no  independent  revenues it would not 
be  absolutely essential to  extend  the  budgetary control powers 
of the  European Parliament,  however desirable  this might  be  in 
itself.  Both  the  Second  Chamber  in the  Dutch Parliament  and 
the  Bundestag wanted  the  Parliament to  have  certain legislative 
powers;  the  two  resolutions passed by the  European Parliament 
on 24 September and  20  October 1965 at this  time  under discus-
sion had  a  similar import.  The  timetable for consolidating the 
democratic  component  in the  Community had not been  drawn  up  un-
wisely but there had perhaps  been  undue  haste in the  attempt  to 
give it effect.  The  speaker felt that it would  be  reasonable 
to act  on the  EEC  Commission memorandum  in slowing down  the 
pace  of integration;  he  found it unfortunate however that the 
memorandum  made  no  mention of trade policy for he  considered 
the latter of capital importance.  The  modest  motion of the 
previous year concerning the  powers  of  the  European Parliament 
still held good,  he  concluded;  the  requests that the  democratic 
component  of  the  Community  be  consolidated would not  be  with-
drawn. 
Mr.  Boertien  (Anti-revolutionary Party)  and Mr.  Bos  (His-
torical Christian Union)  both endorsed this view,  although the 
latter felt that it would  be  preferable first to  stave off the 
attacks  on  the  Treaty and  then strive for  a  more  intensive dem-
ocratization;  he  regarded this as  the  essential complement  to 
discussions  on majority lines on  the  Council  of Ministers. 
Mr.  Berkhouwer  (People's Party for Freedom and  Democracy) 
disagreed with the  latter view.  Democratic  control was  not  the 
complement  of majority vote decisions but  the  reverse side  of 
the  same  coin.  In fact,  200  million Europeans  were  becoming 
increasingly subject to European regulations without  there 
being any adequate  control over these regulations by the Euro-
pean Parliament.  One  flagrant  example  that he  quoted was  the 
proposed subsidies to  shipbuilding.  Treaty Article  138  on the 
direct election of  the  European Parliament implied that it be 
endowed  wi~h the  necessary powers. 
Of  course  the Parliament had not  to  become  over-absorbed 
in such technical matters  as  colouring agents,  rear lights or 
- 45 -stud guns.  It also had to  have  its say in the  major political 
decisions.  Yet  national prerogatives when  ceded had to  be  re-
placed by adequate  European prerogatives in this key.  The 
speaker felt this was  vital. 
In reply to  the  speakers  from  the various  groups,  Mr.  Luns 
said that  "one  of  the  main victims,  if not  the  only victim of 
the crisis which broke  out in Europe  on  30  June  was  beyond 
doubt  the  European Parliament  and its powers."  Certain re-
quirements,  justified though  they were,  could not  be  considered 
at present.  The  Dutch  Government  felt that it was  better to 
concentrate  on preserving what  had been  achieved,  rather than 
on  improving  on  these results. 
In compliance  with the  Biaisse motion of  8  June  1965,  the 
Dutch  Government  had vigorously supported the  claims for ex-
tended powers  that the  European Parliament had  made.  The  ef-
fect was,  however,  that the  relevant proposals had not been 
discussed during the  Council  sessions  that led up  to  the cri-
sis.  Now  that the  question of independent  revenues  for the 
Community had been referred forward  to 1970,  the  EEC  Commission 
.-and  the  European Parliament  regarded the  problem as  not quite 
so  urgent.  The  Government  felt that in future it had to  con-
tinue  to  regard the  question of  granting independent  revenues 
to  the  Community  as  connected with that of  enhancing the  pow-
ers of budgetary control  of the  European Parliament.  Its ef-
forts  would  also  be  directed at increasing the  powers  of  the 
European Parliament  in other spheres,  including that of legis-
lation. 
Mr.  Luns  felt that the  Treaty would be  liable to lose all 
its pith if Mr.  Vr.edeling's  proposal - to  link the  application 
of the majority vote  principle with strengthening the powers 
of  the  European Parliament  - were  adopted.  This  was  why  the 
Dutch  Government  would not  endorse  Mr.  Vredeling's  suggestion. 
Similarly,  Mr.  Luns  felt it would  be  inadvisable  to  oppose  ac-
celerating the  implementation of  the  Common  Market  on 1  July 
1966 on the  grounds  that  the  powers  of  the  European Parliament 
were  too slim.  This  was  too  radical  a  tactic. 
After the  EEC  Commission had submitted its memorandum  to 
the  Council,  discussions  were  held at which  the  Dutch  Govern-
ment  reserved its position as  to the  need to  strengthen the 
powers  of the Parliament with respect not  only to budgets but 
also to  legislation; it therefore felt that it could raise this 
issue again whenever it thought fit. 
It was  the  Commission itself that was  responsible for the 
slackened pace  of integration.  The  speaker wondered,  further-
more,  whether the  EEC  Commission had been very wise  in publish-
ing its second  document  so  soon after the  crisis came  to  a  head. 
- 46  -In conclusion,  Mr.  Luns  hoped that the  other Parliaments 
would continue to  show  the  same  interest in the  status of the 
European Parliament;  iLthey did  so  this could  be  of great val-
value in due  course. 
The  question was  referred to a  secret committee  which  was 
due  to  meet  in December. 
d)  The  external relations  of the  Community 
The  Kennedz_Round  of negotiations 
Mr.  Westerterp  (Catholic People's Party) described the 
deadlock in the  Kennedy negotiations  consequent  upon  the  EEC 
crisis; he  asked if the  Dutch  Government  would  be  ready to  ask 
the  Council  - if necessary a  Council  of  Five  - to  give  the 
EEC  Commission  a  new  negotiating mandate  by  31  January 1966 at 
the latest.  This  supplementary mandate  was  necessary if the 
negotiations were  to  be  concluded before  30  June  1966.  He 
feared that if the  Kennedy  Round  failed,  the protectionists in 
the  United States would  be  in a  stronger position;  similarly, 
if the  USA  reached agreements  with the  non-Member States,this 
could have  unfortunate  economic  repercussions  for the  Communi-
ty. 
Mr.  Vredeling  (Labour Party)  asked if it were  not  abso-
lutely essential for the  Council  to  take  a  qualified majority 
decision on this point. 
Mr.  De  Block,  Secretary of State,  pointed out that the  EEC 
Commission's  negotiating mandate  lent itself to  a  restrictive 
interpretation.  The  Commission would  therefore  be  able  to  con-
tinue its work until January.  Its mandate  could also  be  inter-
preted along broader lines and  the  question could be  debated 
with the Five;  alternatively,  the  negotiations  could  be  sus-
pended until the  deadlock  were  resolved.  He  felt it was  too 
soon to  introduce  the  qualified majority system,  especially 
since it would  make  the  negotiations very unrealistic,  unless 
things  reached the  stage  where  the  split between the Five  and 
France  became  final  and they negotiated separately.  This  stage, 
however,  had not  been  reached  and would  not  be  as  long as  there 
was  still hope  of  mending the  Community. 
In mid-January,  the  EEC  Commission would  submit  a  fresh 
memorandum  which  would pave  the  way for further negotiations. 
Yet  there  was  one  major snag:  negotiations  would  embrace  in-
dustry and  agriculture  and,  in the  latter case,  the negotia-
tions were  impossible  except in the  case  of cereals unless 
prices were  set;  this  could  only be  done  with France's co-oper-
ation,  hence  the Five  were  locked in a  vicious circle. 
- 47  -Relations between the  EEC  and  EFTA 
One  of the  focal points in the  debate  was  the  EFTA  memo-
randum to the  Community.  Mr.  Blaisse  (Catholic People's Party) 
felt that any  attempt  to  make  contact with EFTA,  whose  struc-
ture was  different,  would be  inadvisable; it might  also carry 
certain dangers for the  organization of  the  EEC,  for the  Five 
would  be  starting on  the  downward  slope of intergovernmental 
politics. 
There  were  many  in the  United Kingdom  and  in other EFTA 
countries who  thought  that bridge-building was  both practical 
and possible.  Mr.  Patijn (Labour Party)  considered this a 
serious error of  judgement.  ~FTA was  in fact set up  for no 
other purpose  than to provide  a  negotiating position vis-a-vis 
the  Common  Market.  Customs  barriers could of course be  lowered 
but  this did not  add  up  to  any real  economic  policy.  The  dan-
gers  of bridge-building under present circumstances would  be to 
stimulate  the  United Kingdom's  interest in establishing a  free 
trade  area.  There  was  only one  solution that could really pro-
mote  the  development  of  Europe  and that was  for the United 
Kingdom  and  the  other EFTA  countries to  join the EEC. 
Mr.  Berkhouwer  (People's Party for  Freedom  and  Democracy) 
pointed out  that to  date  EFTA  had never ventured so  far towards 
discussions  through any of  its organs  at any level.  It was 
furthermore  erroneous  to  suppose  that the accession of the 
United Kingdom  could  be  considered as  an alternative if France 
withdrew.  Although  France  could not  do  without 'Europe,  Europe 
in turn could not  do  without  France  and  the  same  applied to  the 
United Kingdom. 
Lastly,  Mr.  Nederhorst  (Labour Party)  stated that bridge-
building predicated two  pillars,  one  of  which  was  in the  proc-
ess  of  crumbling.  All  the talks  about  a  rapprochement,  fur-
thermore,  could  only give rise to  illusions.  The  seriousness 
of the  EEC  crisis could very  soon lead out  into  a  quite differ-
ent situation calling for quite different measures. 
Mr.  De  Block,  Secretary of State,  said in reply:  "Neither 
we  nor the  EFTA  countries  can delude  ourselves into thinking 
that a  rapprochement  between EFTA  and  the  EEC,  or an  amalgam-
ation of the  two  or even the  building of  a  bridge between  the 
two  can really be  regarded as realistic.  We  cannot  think in 
terms  of fruitful co-operation based on  the  ideas  and princi-
ples  of the  Treaty when  their import is not  assessed at its 
true value:  The  Treaty will not  allow us  to dilute the  EEC 
wine  to  the  taste of the  EFTA  countries." 
- 48-Internal problems  of  the  EEC 
The  question of  independent  revenues  for the  EEC  was  re-
ferred forward  to  1970 in the  EEC  Commission  memorandum  of  18 
July.  The  common  external tariff,  however,  was  due  to  come  in-
to  force  on  1  July 1967.  The  resulting revenues  would  thus 
have  to  be  divided in proportion,  in compliance with  a  scale 
based on the  customs  receipts  during a  period of reference 
still to be  specified.  Mr.  Westerterp  (Catholic People's Par-
ty)  saw this as  a  method  of making  independent  revenues  avail-
able  to  the  Community in a  way  both covert  and without  legal 
basis;  this could furthermore  be  done  without  reference  to the 
national parliaments by recourse  to Treaty Article 235.  Such  a 
procedure would not  only weaken  the  Treaties still further but 
would  also provide  a  loophole  in 1970 for evading the  obliga-
tion to  endow  the  European Parliament with increased budgetary 
powers.  Mr.  Vredeling  (Labour Party)  adopted the  same  argu-
ments  in proposing that administrative frontiers  should be 
maintained within the  Community for through transport. 
In reply,  Mr.  De  Block,  Secretary of State,  stated that 
the perequation of  customs  receipts was  a  German  proposal  that 
was  not  in any way  supported by the  five  other countries.  He 
furthermore  shared in their broad outlines  the  views  expressed 
by Mr.  Westerterp  to the effect that this method could usher in 
the  appearance  of  independent  revenues.  He  went  on  to  say that 
until the  turnover taxation issue had been settled,  there was 
no  guarantee,  if frontiers  were  maintained until 1  January 
1970,  that there  would  not  be  a  diversion of trade.  When  in 
July 1967  the  internal frontiers  had been  removed,  the  customs 
tariffs standardized and  when  customs  duties were  no  longer 
justified except  by turnover tax,  the diversion of traffic 
could be  settled by recourse  simply to  a  settlement  of  the 
turnover tax payments.  (Second  Chamber,  session 1965-66.  Com-
mittee responsible  for  the  Foreign Affairs  Budget.  Second 
meeting,  2  December  1965) 
3.  Parliamentary control over milk price policy 
In reply to  a  written question from  Mr.  Vredeling  (Labour 
Party),  Mr.  Biesheuvel,  Dutch Minister for Agriculture,  stated 
on 15  December  1965 that in his view the  anticipated EEC  Com-
mission proposals for establishing a  common  price  system for 
agricultural products - including dairy-produce  - had  to  pro-
ceed along the  same  lines  as for the  common  level  of cereal 
prices.  The  EEC  Commission proposals  on  the  common  price for 
cereals,  were  submitted with the  assent of  the  Council  to  the 
Parliament for its Opinion.  The  Parliament had signified its 
agree~ent on  8  January 1964. 
Mr.  Biesheuvel also felt that democratic  control of deci-
sion-taking in the  EEC  had to  be  consolidated;  this was  the 
- 49  -standpoint that the  Dutch  Government  had consistently adopted. 
(Addendum,  Proceedings  in the  Second  Chamber,  193,  No.  124) 
- 50  -